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PHENOMENOLOGY AND EXISTENTIALISM:
Husserl and Sartre on Intentionality

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This paper (in slightly modified form) was read as part of a symposium on phenomenology and existentialism held by the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association on April 30, 1959, at Madison, Wisconsin.

Heraldry and genealogy are cognate disciplines; the former often leads to exciting emblems, the latter sometimes to family embarrassments. An exploration of some central roots of existentialism certainly leads back to phenomenology, and following the line of Sartrean thought brings us quickly to Husserl's philosophy. Whether the results are more embarrassing than exciting may be decided later. Right now the problem is the nature of the family relationship. I will begin by suggesting that this relationship has as its ground Husserl's doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness and that Sartre's existentialism derives from a problematic critique and transformation of that doctrine. I will end by suggesting that Sartre's inadequacies illuminate Husserl's achievements.

The prime character of consciousness, for Husserl, is its implicit directionality. All consciousness is consciousness *of* something; all acts of consciousness intend some object. The ontological status of the

intended object is neutralized by phenomenological reduction, so that the question of whether the object intended is real, illusory, hallucinatory, imaginary, independent, subsistent, or transitory is set aside for purposes of description. Whether the intended object is veridical has nothing to do with its status as intended. The task of the phenomenologist, then, is to investigate phenomena as correlates of the acts which intend them. Just as phenomenological reduction neutralizes the ontological placement of the object, so it sets in abeyance the belief in personal identity, history, and empirical reality of the individual making phenomenological descriptions. The central terms of the phenomenological enterprise are within the structure of intentionality; real object and real person are no proper part of that structure. Instead, they may appear only as intentional concerns; that is, they may be considered as meant or intended objects of consciousness.

Some critics of phenomenology have taken this conception of intentional consciousness as a paradigm case of subjectivism or some kind of solipsism. They have suggested that Husserl has abandoned the real world, that his procedure of phenomenological reduction leaves the phenomenologist in epistemic isolation, and that, consequently, there is no way of ever achieving objective confirmation of phenomenological reports. An indirect but interesting answer to these complaints is found in Sartre's interpretation of intentionality, for the whole point of his positive reaction to phenomenology is that he found in Husserl's early writings a deliverance from subjectivism, an escape from the egocentric predicament. The overwhelming importance of intentionality for Sartre was what he took to be Husserl's insistence on a view of consciousness which transcended the subject-object dualism, which overcame the traditional debates of idealism and realism, and which opened up for the first time a view of consciousness which placed the self in the world, in the midst of life, in direct confrontation with being. Through phenomenology a return to "the things themselves" had taken place. What Quentin Lauer has called phenomenology's "triumph of subjectivity" was initially, for Sartre, a triumph over subjectivism. But victor and vanquished must be examined more closely.

[1]Originally published in *Nouvelle revue française*, January 1939; reprinted in Jean-Paul Sartre's *Situations I* (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), pp. 31-35. Our references are to the latter edition.

What impresses Sartre in the phenomenological theory of intentionality is the nonegological conception of consciousness developed in Husserl's *Logical Investigations.* Intentionality in this perspective does not derive from a subject pole which is the condition for its activity. At this stage there is no transcendental ego to serve as the dynamic matrix for intentional acts. The emphasis, then, is necessarily on the noematic side of the intentional stream. Consciousness brings us face to face with reality as the correlate of intentional acts. Instead of an ego building its world, constituting its experiential façade, consciousness is thrust into reality and locates its egological nature after the encounter. The ego arises with experience; it has no status prior to experience. It is at this point that Sartre seizes on the nonegological conception of consciousness and announces its existential possibilities. For if the ego is not an original resident of consciousness, consciousness reveals itself as translucent, as a nothingness which fulfills itself purely in its intentional activity. What for Husserl began as an emphasis on the noematic aspect of the phenomena is radically transposed by Sartre into a theory of consciousness in which the nonbeing of the ego is the prime phenomenological datum. Husserl's nonegological theory of consciousness becomes transformed into a philosophy of nihilation.

Although Sartre's essay "The Transcendence of the Ego" is the first major statement announcing his transformation of Husserl's doctrine, his fascination with the possibilities of the phenomenological doctrine of intentionality can be seen more dramatically perhaps in his note entitled "A Fundamental Idea of the Phenomenology of Husserl: Intentionality," published in 1939.[1] Here Sartre interprets Husserl as insisting on the co-givenness of object and consciousness. Consciousness and the world are given simultaneously. And consciousness is an irreducible fact which we can only characterize through metaphors that suggest its thrusting, volatile nature. Knowing is like exploding; mind is centrifugal; consciousness is a vortex; awareness is like combat. Here Sartre is struggling to rid epistemology of the metaphysical incubus of knowledge as possession. For Sartre, one does not *have* knowledge; one bursts out in the acts of knowing toward the object known. Consciousness fires itself toward its mark. These

strange metaphors (some of which are Sartre's and some of which are mine) support each other in suggesting a conception of consciousness as a nonsubstantial presence to the world. Sartre writes:

> Knowledge cannot, without dishonesty, be compared to possession. . . . consciousness is purified, it is clear like a great wind, it no longer has anything in it, except a movement to avoid itself, a gliding beyond itself; if, against all impossibility, you were to enter "into" a consciousness, you would be seized by a vortex and thrown out . . . because consciousness has no "inside"; it is nothing but the outside of itself, and it is that absolute flight, that refusal to be substance which constitutes it as consciousness.[2]

Here, then, is the nexus between Sartre and Husserl, between existentialism and phenomenology. For Sartre the phenomenological doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness not only leads to but *is* an existential theory. Instead of the rather staid conception Husserl presented, Sartre sees in intentionality the full drama of the life of consciousness.

> Imagine [he writes] a linked series of explosions which wrench us from ourselves . . . which throw us on . . . the dry dust of the world, on the rough earth, among things; imagine that we are thus rejected, forsaken by our very nature in an indifferent, hostile and restive world; you would then know the profound meaning of the discovery that Husserl expresses in that famous phrase: "All consciousness is consciousness *of* something."[3]

On the basis of this existentialized conception of intentionality Sartre builds his world. All of the structures of man's being that he explores —the body, concrete relations with other selves, the emotions, imagination—are comprehensible only in terms of their intentional foundation. Perhaps one way of viewing this procedure is to suggest that perception, understood in the broad Cartesian sense, possesses a cognitive dimension. Feeling, sensory awareness, emotionality are meaning-laden aspects of human experience, for their nature is

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

grounded in intentional consciousness. Meaning here is not designative or referential; it is precisely that which is presented as the correlate of intentional activity. This approach to meaning becomes clearer if we turn to a further point of connection between phenomenology and existentialism.

Husserl and Sartre agree in their rejection of a naturalistic or scientistic *Weltanschauung*. Physics and mathematics are not accepted as disciplines whose methodological form is paradigmatic for all other intellectual enterprises. Rooted and remaining in the natural attitude, science commits the sin of pride if it insists on projecting its naive realistic vision of the world on to the concrete and unique problems of philosophy and the social sciences. The rejection of scientism is not a rejection of natural science. Rather, phenomenology and existentialism hold to a common front in their insistence on facing phenomena in their givenness, quite apart from causal and genetic considerations. The liberation of logic from physics and psychology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century must be matched by a liberation of epistemology from neurological and behavioristic grounds. This is the whole point of Husserl's refutation of psychologism. And implicit in Sartre's position is the same root dissatisfaction with psychologistic theories. Phenomenology and existentialism are thus bound to each other as much by negative as by positive agreements. The common denominator of intentionality is matched by a mutual disenchantment with the explanatory categories of naturalism.

Yet despite all sympathetic connecting bonds, there are still differences between Husserl and Sartre which are more than family quarrels. There are two points of basic conflict, and they center about Sartre's rejection of the phenomenological reduction and the transcendental ego. His radicalization of Husserl's doctrine of intentionality appears to require the abandonment of the central instrument of phenomenological method as well as the whole grounding of conscious life in a transcendental subject. Sartre's reasons for moving in this direction are complex. In addition to an early invocation of Occam's razor against the transcendental ego in his essay "The Transcendence of the Ego," Sartre goes on later in *Being and Nothingness* to protest against Husserl's idealistic reduction of the phenomenon to the noema as an irrealized object. Sartres writes:

> It is futile to attempt, by a sleight of hand, to found the *reality* of the object on the subjective plenitude of impressions and its *objectivity* on non-being; the objective will never come out of the subjective nor the transcendent from immanence, nor being from non-being. But, we are told, Husserl defines consciousness precisely as a transcendence. In truth he does. This is what he posits. This is his essential discovery. But from the moment that he makes of the *noema* an *irreal*, a correlate of the *noesis*, a noema whose *esse* is *percipi*, he is totally unfaithful to his principle.[4]

Phenomenological reduction and the transcendental ego rob intentionality of its genius by relinquishing the immediate world seized through intentional consciousness. What Sartre calls the transphenomenality of being is lost in the reduction. Now, this criticism relates to, but is not synonymous with, the argument that Sartre rejects the reduction because it brackets out precisely what the existentialist is most concerned with: existence. It is a distortion of Husserl's theory of reductions to accuse the phenomenologist of disregarding or of being unable to regard concrete existence as a philosophical problem. But the misunderstanding appears to me to be compounded by those who suggest it, since neither Husserl nor Sartre, in my opinion, makes this claim or is necessarily involved in such an interpretation. Sartre's attack against the reduction rests immediately on his conviction that the irrealized noema lacks transphenomenal being, that the whole purpose, therefore, of Husserl's doctrine of intentionality has been undermined. Instead of consciousness transcending itself toward the objects of reality, consciousness falls back upon itself. Sartre does not argue, however, that the phenomenologist's concept of existence is somehow a shadow of the real thing, that existence in its givenness as phenomenon is a surrogate for flesh and blood reality. Indeed, it might be suggested at this point that Sartre's rejection of the reduction is based partly on phenomenological considerations, upon a common refusal with Husserl to take what is called concrete existence at face value. Those who insist on a

[4] *L'Etre et le néant* (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), p. 28. The present translation is my revision of Hazel E. Barnes's translation, *Being and Nothingness* (New York: Philosophical Lib., 1956), p. lxiii.

[5] *Being and Nothingness*, p. 109.

distinction between the object as intended or meant and the real honest-to-goodness object itself presuppose a theory of *action* in which the term "real" operates as a predicate of force, displacement, and material efficacy. One major consequence of the alignment between Sartre and Husserl, I submit, is the interpretation of action as an intentional category. The real honest-to-goodness thing is the thing interpreted as honest and good, and interpretation becomes the signal moment of action. Sartre's break with Husserl is not to be found along these lines. It is not a question of existence but of transcendence. Phenomenological reduction and the transcendental ego, according to Sartre, draw us away from the reality which intentionality not only promised but gave. The Husserlian *cogito* remains trapped in immanence. Sartre writes:

> If Husserl's *cogito* is first given as instantaneous, there is no way to get outside it . . . Husserl for the length of his philosophical career was haunted by the idea of transcendence . . . But the philosophical techniques at his disposal removed from him any way of accounting for that transcendence; his intentionality is only the caricature of it. Consciousness, as Husserl conceived it, can not in reality transcend itself either toward the world or toward the future or toward the past.[5]

Sartre believes that he has liberated the lonely ego and delivered Husserl's theory of intentionality from the essential misunderstanding of its creator. It is now time to examine Sartre's good works.

Although the radicalization of intentionality requires the rejection of the transcendental ego, what is gained carries with it the impact of what is lost. Sartre is now faced with the problem of accounting for the unity and continuing identity of the ego. If the ego is, as Sartre maintains, "a being of the world, like the ego of another," if it arises only through reflection, then how is it possible to account for the ego as being *mine*? How is it that I do not confuse my ego with that of the other? Sartre answers these questions by appealing to a certain intimacy which attends my ego, to transverse intentions which spontaneously bind together the ego as object of reflection. The result, he says, is that "my I, in effect, is *no more certain for consciousness*

than the I of other men. It is only more intimate."[6] But this spontaneously personal ego constitutes itself as mysteriously as any transcendental ego. Moreover, a circle in explanation results. A phenomenology of intimacy is invoked to account for personal identity when the very recognition of the ego presupposes a recognizing agent. Recognizer and recognized are reconciled in the assertion that "my I . . . is no more certain for consciousness than the I of other men." And this, I am suggesting, is reconciliation at the price of circularity. Giving up the transcendental ego deprives Sartre of a constitutive ground for the unity and identity of the self.

Coeval with the rejection of the transcendental ego is the apparent though problematic repudiation of the phenomenological reduction. Sartre argues[7] that Husserl cannot account for the transposition from the mundane to the phenomenological attitude of the individual who begins, as we all do, in the natural attitude. He interprets the natural attitude itself as a kind of objectification of the ego, an instance of "bad faith" in which consciousness seeks to escape from itself. A miracle becomes necessary for the individual in the natural attitude to perform the *epoché.* On Sartrean grounds, however, consciousness is perpetually confronted with *epoché* not as an intellectual method but, in Sartre's words, as "an anxiety which is imposed on us and which we cannot avoid."[8] Phenomenological reduction, then, is really transposed by Sartre rather than simply repudiated. But in his efforts to avoid the idealistic implications of the reduction, Sartre fails to acknowledge his profound debt at this point to Husserl's method. It is, rather, Merleau-Ponty who makes explicit the indebtedness of existentialist philosophy to phenomenological reduction. He writes:

> The philosopher . . . is a perpetual beginner. This means that he holds nothing as established which the popular majority or

[6]*The Transcendence of the Ego,* trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Noonday Press, 1957), p. 104.

[7]*Ibid.*, pp. 102 ff.

[8]*Ibid.*, p. 103.

[9]Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), p. lx. The present translation is my revision of John F. Bannan's translation of the "Avant-Propos" which appears in *Cross Currents* (VI [Winter 1956], 59-70) under the title "What is Phenomenology?" The quotation cited appears on pp. 64-65.

[10]*Ibid.*

[11]"Husserl's Phenomenology and Existentialism," paper read as part of a symposium on phenomenology and existentialism held by the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association on April 30, 1959, at Madison, Wisconsin.

> the scientists believe they know. It also means that philosophy cannot consider itself as definitively established in any of the truths which it can utter, that it is a renewed experience of its own beginning, and that it consists entirely of a description of this beginning. It means, finally, that this radical reflection is consciousness of its own dependence upon a non-reflective life which is its initial, constant and final situation. Far from being, as one might think, the formula for an idealistic philosophy, the phenomenological reduction is that of an existentialist philosophy.[9]

Reduction, then, opens up for phenomenological appreciation the full drama of consciousness and its initial placement in the *Lebenswelt.* And rather than Sartre, it is Husserl who should be credited with seeing the full depth of his methodological creation. Here as elsewhere, Sartre's efforts to correct Husserl's "mistakes" miscarry, and this miscarriage is our final theme.

Sartre sees in most of the major principes of phenomenology implicit clues to existential philosophy; he believes that he is carrying out the vital impulse of Husserl's discoveries. This attitude and its consequences are at once suggestive and misleading. More than anything else, Sartre's advances beyond Husserl illuminate the full range of insights achieved in traditional phenomenology. Husserl's original doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness is not "liberated" through Sartre's radicalization; it merely includes the existential dimension as one of its possibilities; phenomenological reduction is not positively transposed in Sartre's analysis, for the existential possibilities were there all along; and finally, Sartre's rejection of the transcendental ego ignores its existential implications.[10] Here Sartre's determination to rescue Husserl from himself blinds him to the very subjectivity existentialism seeks. It is in this sense that Sartre's inadequacies illuminate Husserl's achievements.

If Sartre's existentialism cannot be examined without some concern for Husserl's phenomenology, it is no less the case today that Husserl is being looked at suspiciously because of Sartre's exploits. Professor Herbert Spiegelberg in a recent paper[11] warns us that phenomenology should not sell its birthright for a mess of existentialist

pottage. I would suggest instead that this warning should be the occasion for self-examination rather than embarrassment, and self-examination is the first principle of Husserl's philosophizing. Most, if not all, of the results of Sartre's technical contributions will have to be reexamined phenomenologically to separate the responsible from the purely spectacular, but there is no doubt in my mind that something responsible as well as original is there to be sifted. Talk of "existentialist pottage" may give comfort to those who have little patience with either existentialism or phenomenology but who are willing to admit that Husserl, at least, is respectable. If there is any conclusion to these considerations it is that Sartre stole much of his existential fire from Husserl. Or to put the same thing differently, the lesson to be learned from Husserl is that a responsible philosopher may also be a conceptual terrorist.

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ST. ALBERT THE GREAT

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The following bibliography represents an attempt to provide a complete reference to studies of the life and writings of St. Albert the Great. We note, however, that in 1931, M. H. Laurent and J. Congar ("Essai bibliographique albertinienne," *Revue thomiste* XXXVI [1931], 260-92) compiled a complete bibliography of St. Albert. Since to repeat this readily available bibliography in its entirety would serve no purpose, we have decided rather to concentrate upon listing the work done from 1931 to 1958. At the same time, we have included some important listings from Laurent and Congar. These listings are indicated by (*LC*) following the entry. Other abbreviations are *AHDLM* (*Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*) and *BGPM* (*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* [Münster]).

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GABRIEL MARCEL'S NOTION OF VALUE

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Since it is a little known and little discussed subject in the philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, I would like to take this opportunity to bring to the attention of English-speaking philosophers the fact that Marcel has a theory of value. The problem of value is a metaphysical problem because for Marcel the principle of value is being.[1] Now, Marcel prefers to ground his metaphysics in a distinction between the full and the empty, rather than between the one and the many.

> I have written on another occasion that, provided it is taken in its metaphysical and not in its physical sense, the distinction between the *full* and the *empty* seems to me more fundamental than that between the *one* and the *many*. This is particularly applicable to the case in point. Life in a world centered on function is liable to despair because this world is empty . . .[2]

Value is centered in being and must not be considered apart from being. If I am to consider value I must consider both being and a subject or living consciousness because the notion of value presupposes being and a subject; there can be no value without being, in which it is centered, and a subject to affirm or appreciate it. Something which realizes fulfillment (relative fullness of being) must be appreciated or valued by a consciousness which is a subject; it is meaningless without a subject to appreciate it. Ontology demands the addition of intersubjectivity to objective knowledge. A valued object has meaning for *me*, and when it has meaning for me it enters into an intersubjective relationship for me.[3] I am open to this object and it has meaning for me. This is true both in my relationships with things considered as things and in my relationships with people considered

as things. So long as the thing or person is considered as a thing it is not appreciated by a consciousness—it is not valued and its fulfillment has no meaning.

Value varies directly with fullness of being. What is "full" of being is "full" of value and what is empty of being has no value. "The whole is of value as a whole, either for itself or for the agent that conserves it (for the moment I am not going deeper into this distinction)."[4] Marcel refers to the mysterious dovetailing of being and value.[5] They dovetail in a mysterious[6] way and cannot be separated. "The fact, however, that being cannot be separated from the exigence of being, must never be lost sight of. Therein lies the fundamental reason for the impossibility of severing being from value."[7] Marcel is emphatic on this point. Not only does he say that they are inseparable but that to deny the connection between being and value, as certain logical positivists do, is to deny reality. "There is no surer way to the denial of reality as such. This devaluation of being means turning it into a *caput mortuum*, a mere abstract residue."[8] Marcel even says that value can only be thought of as reality.[9]

The problem of value is a mysterious problem of the full and the

[1]"Si nous ne donnons pas à ce principe un nom propre, nous ne pourrons le désigner que par le mot *être*, car tout appel de la valeur nous invite à *être* davantage" (Roger Troisfontaines, S.J., *De l'existence à l'être* [Louvain, 1953] p. 311).

[2]*The Philosophy of Existence* (London, 1958), p. 3.

[3]Marcel, *Faith and Reality* (Chicago, 1951), p. 46.

[4]Marcel, *Being and Having* (Boston, 1951), p. 148.

[5]*Faith and Reality*, p. 46.

[6]Marcel defines mystery as "a problem which encroaches upon its own data" (*The Philosophy of Existence*, p. 11).

[7]*Faith and Reality*, p. 61. It is interesting to note that Marcel speaks of severing being from value and not value from being, since being is a more fundamental notion than value.

[8]*Being and Having*, p. 223.

[9]"Value can only be thought of as reality—and by that I mean saved from a verbalism which destroys while thinking to proclaim it—if it is related to the consciousness of an immortal destiny" (*Homo Viator* [Chicago, 1951], p. 152).

[10]"At bottom we are still dealing with the opposition between the full and the empty—an opposition which is infinitely more essential than that of the single and the multiple" (*Metaphysical Journal* [Chicago, 1952], p. 181).

[11]"Thus we have a synthesis of the images and movements which form the deepest reality of the object, of the object considered as value and not simply as physical datum" (*ibid.*, p. 167).

[12]*Ibid.*, p. 174.

[13]*Ibid.*, p. 161.

[14]"What is lacking here is the necessary minimum of agreement about ends, about the supreme value" (*Faith and Reality*, p. 176).

[15]*The Philosophy of Existence*, p. 25.

[16]*Faith and Reality*, p. 118.

[17]*Homo Viator*, p. 157.

empty.[10] What is valuable to me, or presents a value to me, is interesting and meaningful to me-as-a-subject. I open myself to it and it is "present" to me—it exists for me in a special way, and I cannot be indifferent to it. I consider it as value and not merely as physical data.[11]

I can have real communication with that which has value.[12] The valuable is real and mysterious.

> Our world is certainly not a world from which the mysterious is excluded, a world in which all that has the power of communicating itself communicates itself directly and spontaneously. Hence there is an intimate relationship between the idea of mystery and the idea of value. Only that which is capable of interesting me and presenting a value for me is mysterious.[13]

What is valuable for Marcel covers a wide territory, ranging from God, the supreme value,[14] to any inanimate object that may have meaning for me. (In any case, the value must be related to a subject —to *me.*) Even a word can have metaphysical value if it has meaning for me. There can be metaphysical value in a word such as the word "with" because of all that is implied in the word. To be with someone implies communication with the person—an intersubjective relationship whereby I have a greater share or fullness of being. " 'Even if I cannot see you, if I cannot touch you, I feel that you are with me; it would be a denial of you not to be assured of this.' " [15] Another instance of the metaphysical value of a word is given by Marcel: "I emphasized the metaphysical value that attaches, or rather should be attached in the French language to the preposition *chez*, our equivalent of the Latin *apud* . . ." [16] For Gabriel Marcel a word that is overused or misused loses its value of meaning through the abuse. As an example of this process he says that the term *mysticism* has been emptied of all value.[17]

Value is centered in being; it is in the realm of the personal or subjective (more properly intersubjective) and has no meaning in the realm of "scientific" impersonal facts. If I treat something which has value as a fact I take away its value. Scientific analysis of the type attempted by Freud in his work is the sort of treatment of the data of

human experience that denudes it of value[18]—for instances, Freud's reduction of man's religious life to libido expressed in myth.

If I look at people in a pragmatic way rather than in a way that befits them as human beings, as subjects, I devaluate them and take away from the fullness of their being. I suppress the value of their being.[19] My relationship with that which is valuable must be an intersubjective relationship if what is valued is to remain valuable for me. Whether it be an object that is present to me or another person who is present[20] to me, it must never be treated mechanically.

According to Marcel, the technical progress that will take place in the future will not further the progress of the knowledge of values themselves; in fact, the technocratic craze will gradually drown the feeling for values.[21]

> Our world today really gathers itself together against these needs . . . to the very extent to which technical processes have emancipated themselves today from the ends to which they ought normally to remain subordinate, and have staked a claim to an autonomous reality, or an autonomous value.[22]

[18]*The Philosophy of Existence*, p. 5.

[19]"In ordinary life there is nothing to prevent me from behaving to other people in a way which corresponds to this quite pragmatic way of looking at them. Servants are an obvious example. But a husband, after all, can treat his wife as a servant; a father his son, and so on. In these instances we cannot help seeing the real suppression of the value of being. But what we realize at the same time is that it cannot be so suppressed without involving a ghastly mutilation of human relations; we may put it more strongly and say that these human relations entirely lose their specific character. So this by-road has brought us back to intersubjectivity again" (*Faith and Reality*, p. 55).

[20]"There is infinite value in the fact of feeling another to be present, and infinite value in contact as such" (*Metaphysical Journal*, p. 302).

[21]"The outcome of all these considerations is the conclusion that whatever technical progress posterity may make when compared with us, there will be no progress in its knowledge of values themselves. I shall go further and say that if there is no sign of conversion—in my last chapter we shall have to consider the nature of this conversion—the technocratic craze will gradually succeed in drowning every feeling for values; and this precisely because they are eternal, and a man who lived two thousand years ago was at bottom no worse off than we are, for knowing what is or is not right" (*Faith and Reality*, p. 99).

[22]*Reflection and Mystery*, p. 21.

[23]*Ibid.*, pp. 98-99.

[24]*Ibid.*, p. 85.

[25]"Nevertheless we need to recognise clearly the transition from existence to presence; and I am wondering whether it is not by presence that we can effect the transition from existence to value. Is not that which has value also that which increases in us the feeling of presence . . ." (*Metaphysical Journal*, p. 317).

Value is not something that can be learned through the development of science. It belongs to the realm of that which is intersubjective and not to the realm of physical facts.

> How can one imagine for a moment that the future development of science will be able to throw any light on true values? All we can anticipate is a continuation of more and more extensive research, from which we shall learn what is judged to be good or bad in different types of society. We can easily imagine also that a sort of social physics might explain approximately the connection, for example, between various moral beliefs and the birth or suicide rate. But it is quite obvious that such conclusions can tell us nothing about values. It is beyond the power of science to tell us whether it is right or wrong to increase the population; it will only be able to remind us that unless certain economic conditions are fulfilled, over-population can become a grave social danger.[23]

Sartre observes that this devaluation can radically depreciate humility. "[It] can . . . be robbed of its value in the name of existential psychoanalysis." [24] That is to say, something that has value, meaning, or importance for me loses its value through being treated in a mechanical or scientific way—through being treated as a mere fact.

That which has value is that which increases in us the feeling of presence.[25] It increases the feeling of being "with" another; of being open to, and receiving, the other as a subject rather than as "other." When I am open to, and accept, the other I recognize the value of the other; and insofar as I do this, I increase my being. On the other hand, insofar as I am closed to another, I become emptied of being and lose interest in the other. In a world which answers us mechanically there are times when life seems empty and nothing is of importance. Nothing interests us because nothing seems to have value or meaning for us.

> Our activity needs to be exercised to the full in a world of fulness. The experiences in function of which the problem of being can be posited in an intelligible way are happiness, love and inspira-

tion. But here the problem concerns *being* and not *some being*.[26]

It is interesting to note that in many ways Marcel's notion of value is like that of the atheist existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre. For Sartre also, value has reference to a fullness or completeness.[27] For Sartre it is something beyond our reach in this world. This was expressed in *La nausée*.

> For Roquentin all *value* lies in the unattainable world of intelligible completeness which he represents to himself in simple intellectual terms; he is not (until the end) duped into imagining that *any* form of human endeavour is adequate to his yearning to rejoin that totality.[28]

A major difference between the Christian and atheist existentialist is that for Marcel there is an afterlife in eternity[29] and therefore hope; whereas for Sartre there is no afterlife and nothing to look forward to. The atheist existentialist has no hope; for him man is left alone to make his way through the meaningless situation of life. This hopelessness is well brought out by Camus in *The Stranger*.

> What difference could they make to me, the death of others, or a mother's love, or his God; or the way a man decides to live, the fate he thinks he chooses since one and the same fate was bound to "choose" not only me but thousands of millions of privileged people, who, like him, called themselves my brothers. . . . All alike would be condemned to die one day; his turn too would come like the others.[30]

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 206.

[27] "A sense of value then is a sense of lack, a lack of a certain completeness; and the reflective consciousness which reveals to us this lack (under the eye of which what we *are* shrivels, as it were, to nothing) is properly called a moral consciousness" (Iris Murdoch, *Sartre, Romantic Rationalist* [New Haven, 1953], p. 44).

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[29] "In any event it seems to me established that the eternal cannot be defined without reference to value" (*Metaphysical Journal*, p. 151).

[30] *The Stranger* (New York, 1955), p. 152.

[31] *Homo Viator*, p. 154.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 270.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 155.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 141.

[35] Troisfontaines, *De l'existence à l'être*, p. 312.

[36] Marcel, *Homo Viator*, p. 141.

[37] Troisfontaines, *De l'existence à l'être*, p. 312.

[38] Marcel, *Homo Viator*, p. 152.

For Marcel the prospect of death is not provocative of despair; the way a man decides to live does make a difference because life in this world leads to a "world more firmly established in Being." [31] Marcel closes his *Homo Viator* with the following invocation:

> Let us allow hope to penetrate to our hearts that this spirit may transmute us so intimately ourselves that we shall be able to face the desolate prospect with a rejuvenated soul, full of acceptance and in tune with the unfathomable.
>
> Oh spirit of metamorphosis:
>
> When we try to obliterate the frontier of clouds which separates us from the other world, guide our unpractised movements! And, when the given hour shall strike, arouse us, eager as the traveller who straps on his rucksack while beyond the misty window pane the earliest rays of dawn are faintly visible.[32]

It has been established that the value problem is a metaphysical problem, and it is now necessary to consider the fact that for Marcel value must be incarnate. Value is not a mere abstraction; it must be embodied. "A value is nothing if it is not incarnated." [33] What does it mean for a value to be incarnated, and in what is it embodied?

It is of the nature of value to assume a special function in relation to life.[34] "Elle [la valeur] lui appose son sceau; elle sacre ou consacre notre existence." [35] This means that if I dedicate myself to some cause, such as liberty, in which a value is involved, the value consecrates my life; it makes my life sacred. And by this consecration my life is delivered from the vicissitudes of history.[36] Value is embodied in us and can be seen in the acts we perform.[37] The word *justice* is not a value, but justice can be seen in my just action.

To dedicate myself to a cause in which a value is concerned is not an easy thing. Struggle and sacrifice are involved.[38] When I dedicate myself to some such cause as truth, it is to truth as an incarnate value that I dedicate myself and not to the abstract term.

> It is obvious at first glance that a traditional formula, such as "truth is the adequation of the thing and the intellect", whatever its theoretic value may be, is by no means suited to throw

> light on such assertions. There would be no meaning in saying that somebody has died for the adequation of the thing and the intellect.[39]

It is ridiculous to say that I give life for an abstract term like "liberty." I do not sacrifice myself for something that is not value-incarnated in something concrete and meaningful for me. I may die for an embodied value that is at stake but not for a definition.[40] To say this is false is to fall back into a game that does not recognize itself as such.[41]

> We do not consent to die for beauty in general, or even for liberty in general; all that means absolutely nothing. We accept death in order to save our country, or perhaps more truly for our enslaved brothers. Again it would be well to ask ourselves exactly what we mean by *dying for*. Death must be an act, it must be felt as a possible mode of sharing in a certain good which is itself bound up with history.[42]

To dedicate oneself to a cause in which a value is involved requires sacrifice whether the cause be liberty, justice, art, or anything else. In fact Marcel says that value is probably always related to sacrifice, at least to possible sacrifice.[43] Value involves sacrifice and so involves courage. "It seems probable then that a fundamental relationship is established between value and courage by the facts these reflections have disclosed and by the mediation of sacrifice."[44] Value is not separate from sacrifice and courage.[45] But this does not mean that "we must localise the value in the effort at the price of which,"[46] for instance, a work of art is created. It is absurd to reduce value to the

[39]Marcel, *Reflection and Mystery*, p. 58.

[40]The influence of Cardinal Newman on Marcel is manifest here as this notion is found in Newman's *A Grammar of Assent*.

[41]"In light of these remarks, we see clearly that value can only be incarnate; if indeed it is reduced to an abstract definition we fall back once more into our game and, consequently into falsehood, for here the game does not know itself to be a game" (Marcel, *Homo Viator*, p. 143).

[42]*Ibid.*, p. 144.

[43]*Ibid.*, p. 143.

[44]*Ibid.*, p. 144.

[45]"We have seen clearly that it [value] is not separated from courage and sacrifice" (*ibid.*, p. 152).

[46]*Ibid.*, p. 144.

[47]*Ibid.*, p. 144.

[48]*Faith and Reality*, p. 48.

[49]*Metaphysical Journal*, p. 295.

[50]*Homo Viator*, p. 153.

[51]*Ibid.*, pp. 153-54.

mere effort we have paid in analyzing the works of art.[47] Why? Because from our foregoing analysis we know that with value is *insolubly* connected the vigilant rejection of the facile, the vulgar, and the self-complacent, which ever tend to grow up as a circumstance surrounding and devaluating what we do. However, there can be a maximum of effort without this vigilance. Hence value and merit-effort are different.

Value is incarnated in a person. Each person has his own value[48] —has infinite value and should be treated accordingly.

> I think that the Christian idea of the infinite value of souls is fundamentally no more than a negation of the belief in a price, in a tariff-rate that can be applied to persons. Of course we admit quite spontaneously that a person has no commercial value (even when we transpose the meaning of those words).[49]

Each person or consciousness is the bearer of a unique value destined for eternity. There is a real relation between value and immortality. Man is destined for the "other world," and it is through value that we get a glimpse of our true destiny which is "truer than ourselves."[50] Value is a connection for us between this, the terrestrial world, and the other world, the eternal world.

> Perhaps a stable order can only be established if a man is acutely aware of his condition as a traveller, that is to say, if he perpetually reminds himself that he is required to cut himself a dangerous path across the unsteady blocks of a universe which has collapsed and seems to be crumbling in every direction. This path leads to a world more firmly established in Being, a world whose changing and uncertain gleams are all that we can discern here below.[51]

The problem of value is a metaphysical problem. Marcel tells us that value is grounded in being and cannot be considered as separate from being. Along with value we must consider the subject that is open to, or affirms, value. Value is present to "me"—the subject. It exists for me in a special intersubjective way; not as mere physical

data. For Marcel the valuable can be anything from a meaningful inanimate object or a word to God; but whatever it is, it must be related to a subject as another subject rather than as "other." It belongs to the realm of the personal as opposed to the "scientific" or impersonal.

A value must be embodied. It must be embodied in the subject or in something concrete and meaningful to the subject. To dedicate oneself to a cause where a value is concerned is not to dedicate oneself to an abstract term but to a value embodied in something concrete and subjective. Every person has an infinite, unique value; and it is through value that he gains some understanding of the other world, his proper destiny and goal.

THE MEANING OF "POTENTIAL WHOLE" IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

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There are three sorts of totalities—integral, universal, potential. This division is as well known to contemporary Scholastic philosophers and theologians as it was to St. Thomas. The integral and universal wholes are both familiar notions; that of "potential whole" is traditionally clarified by the example of the soul.[1] The soul is a potential whole; its parts are its powers or its levels of perfection. This seems simple enough.

But when we read in the *Secunda Pars* of the *Summa* that this or that virtue is a "potential part" of some other virtue, the relationship is not as clear. Humility, for example, is called a potential part of temperance,[2] and piety a potential part of justice.[3] Does this mean that justice (paying the grocer, for example) includes piety (honoring, loving, obeying one's parents)? Or that humility is a lesser form of temperance, whereas temperance is a more perfect sort of humility?

Again, St. Thomas says that the speculative virtues of scientific knowledge, understanding, and wisdom are divided "in a certain order, as the parts of a potential whole."[4] Does this mean that a science is an imperfect part of metaphysics? And even worse, how can science be a part of understanding, since it presupposes and includes understanding in its use of principles?

Such questions arise because the potential whole is not clearly distinguished from an integral one—and perhaps also because the example of the soul has been used in a misleading fashion. It may be advantageous to consider first the descriptions given by St. Thomas of

the three kinds of totality, and then to see how the notion of potential whole is actually used.

The human body, a line, a house, are common examples of integral wholes. The precise point that makes them integral wholes is that their parts add up to make the whole. From this characteristic it

[1]For examples: ". . . sicut anima suam virtutem manifestat et exercet per potentias distinctas, tamquam per partes potentiales . . ." (Joannes B. Schuster, S.J., *Philosophia Moralis* [Freiburg: Herder, 1952], p. 70); ". . . eo modo quo vegetativum et sensitivum vocantur partes animae rationalis . . ." (Viktor Cathrein, S.J., *Philosophia Moralis* [15ª ed. Freiburg: Herder, 1929], p. 133); ". . . sicut nutritivum et sensitivum sunt partes animae" (Leonard Lehu, O.P., *Philosophia Moralis et Socialis* [Paris: Lecoffre-Cabala, 1914], Vol. I, "De habitibus, virtutibus, et vitiis," No. 29); cf. Eduard Hugon, O.P., *Cursus Philosophiae Thomisticus* (Paris: Lethielleux, 1927), I. 115; II, Part II, 195-96.

St. Thomas speaks of the vegetative and sensitive souls as "parts" in *In III Sent.*, d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qa. 1; of the powers as "parts" in *ST*, I, q. 76, a. 8, and q. 77, a. 1. See also note 30 below.

[2]*ST*, II-II, q. 143.

[3]*Ibid.*, q. 80.

[4]*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 57, a. 2 ad 2.

[5]*In III Sent.*, d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qa. 1; *ST*, I-II, q. 57, a. 6 ad 4.

[6]*De Spirit. Creat.*, a. 11 ad 2. Also *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 2 ad 1; *ST*, I, q. 77, a. 1 ad 1.

[7]*ST*, I, q. 77, a. 1 ad 1. Integral wholes may have quantitative parts or essential parts. The quantitative parts may be of identical or of diverse constitution. Examples used by St. Thomas are: a line or body (*ST*, I, q. 76, a. 8), a number (*De An.*, a. 10), or a tricubit (*CG*, I, cap. 72). Essential parts are always of diverse constitution and may be parts of a composite (matter and form) or parts of a species (genus and specific difference). See, for example, *In V Metaphys.*, lect. 21 (ed. Cathala, Nos. 1099ff); *In IV Sent.*, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 3; *ST*, I, q. 8, a. 2 ad 3 and q. 77, a. 1 ad 1; and *ST*, III, q. 90, a. 3 ad 3. For a discussion of the integral parts of the various moral virtues, see *ST*, I-II, q. 57, a. 6 ad 4 and *ibid.*, II-II, q. 48, a. unic.; q. 79, a. 1; q. 128, a. unic.; and q. 143, a. unic.

[8]*In IV Sent.*, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 3.

[9]*Ibid.*

[10]"Totum enim universale adest cuilibet parti secundum totam suam essentiam et virtutem, ut animal homini et equo; et ideo proprie de singulis partibus praedicatur" (*ST*, I, q. 77, a. 1 ad 1).

[11]*In IV Sent.*, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 3.

[12]". . . totum potestativum . . . quod est medium inter totum universale et integrale. . . . Totum potentiale adest singulis partibus secundum totam suam essentiam, sed non secundum totam virtutem" (*ST*, I, q. 77, a. 1 ad 1).

[13]"Virtus totius potentialis in partibus ejus, quae quidem complete in una invenitur et in aliis diminute" (*In IV Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 2). Besides the texts listed in note 30 below, see also *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 2 ad 1.

[14]"Et ideo quodammodo [totum potentiale] potest praedicari de qualibet parte, sed non ita proprie sicut totum universale" (*ST*, I, q. 77, a. 1 ad 1). Also *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 2 ad 1.

A special problem in predication arises when the potential whole is not an abstraction but a reality. To our knowledge this happens in only two places in St. Thomas's writings. When the soul is divided into its powers, it remains a reality distinct from these powers, and therefore the soul cannot be properly predicated of these powers (*De Spirit. Creat.*, a. 11 ad 2; *ST*, I, q. 76, a. 8). The second instance is that of grace, which is a potential whole in relation to the virtues (*In III Sent.*, d. 36, q. 1, a. 2). Nothing is explicitly mentioned in this text about predication, but since grace is a reality and not an abstraction, it clearly cannot be properly predicated of the virtues.

follows that the whole is not present to each of its parts, neither essentially nor according to its full power. It is not present essentially, for the hand, head, or legs are not the body, nor can "the body" be predicated of any one of them. Nor is the whole present to any of its integral parts according to its full power, since the complete power of the human body is not exercised by any single part.

The four chief characteristics of the integral whole can therefore be listed as follows: (1) the parts add up to make the whole;[5] (2) the whole is not present essentially to any of its parts (3) nor according to its full power;[6] therefore (4) the whole cannot be predicated of any of its parts.[7]

The universal whole—a genus made up of species or a species of individuals[8]—has exactly the opposite characteristics. (1) The parts do not add up to make the whole.[9] (2) The whole is essentially present to its parts and (3) also according to its full power. (4) Therefore the whole can be properly predicated of each of its parts.[10]

An example of St. Thomas's illustrates these characteristics. (1) The subjective parts of a universal whole do not add up to make a whole—"Three men are not 'animal,' but 'animals.'"[11] (2) The universal whole is essentially present to each of its parts, as the genus "animal" is essentially present in both men and brutes. (3) The full power of the whole, likewise, is present to each of its parts, since all the powers of "animal" are fully realized in each of the species. (4) Finally, the universal whole is properly predicated of each subjective part—a brute is an animal, a man is an animal, in a proper, univocal sense.

The potential whole lies between the integral and universal wholes, though perhaps a bit closer to the latter, since it resembles the universal whole in the first two characteristics and differs only partly in the third and fourth. In a potential whole, (1) the parts do not add up to make the whole. (2) The whole is essentially present to each of its parts, (3) but not according to its full power.[12] This power is found fully only in one of the potential parts, and in a lesser degree in the others.[13] (4) Therefore,[14] the whole is indeed properly predicated of the parts, but not in the same way as a universal whole of its

subjective parts. The more principal part receives the more proper predication.[15]

There are many potential wholes explicitly referred to in the writings of St. Thomas. It seems, however, that the example of the soul, far from clarifying these relationships, has been explained in such a way as to cause misunderstanding, or, at least, confusion. Hence, it may be helpful to consider four different instances, which St. Thomas explains rather fully and which exemplify the four characteristics given above: holy orders, vows, forgiveness of sins, and satisfaction for sin.

Holy orders, considered as a potential whole,[16] can be divided into the priesthood, diaconate, and subdiaconate. Each of these is essentially (truly) an "order," but the fullness of the power of holy orders is found perfectly only in the priesthood and in a diminished way in the other two. Similarly, solemn and private vows[17] are truly vows. The whole—vow—is essentially present, therefore, to each of these "parts," but not according to the fullness of its power, since the full binding force of the vows is found only in the solemn vows. So too, both baptism and penance[18] can forgive sin. The whole—forgiveness of sin—is therefore essentially realized in each of these parts; but since baptism can forgive both original and actual sin, whereas penance

[15]*In III Sent.*, d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qa. 1. In this text St. Thomas actually says that the potential part does not receive the predication of the whole ("Potentialis vero pars neque praedicationem totius recipit"), but he is speaking here of the secondary part ("[quae] aliquid de potentia totius participat," whereas the more principal part shares in the full power). The passage necessary for our present purposes is what immediately follows: "Rationalis enim anima tota anima dicitur . . . . Sensibilis vero in brutis et in plantis vegetabilis dicuntur partes, sed non totum." And from the texts referred to in the previous note, we know that even these secondary parts can receive the predication of the whole, though not as properly as the parts of a universal whole.

[16]*In IV Sent.*, d. 24, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 1 ad 2.

[17]*Ibid.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 2.

[18]*Ibid.*, d. 4, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 1 ad 2.

[19]See above, n. 4, and the text quoted there.

[20]For the division of the sacrament of penance into its integral parts, see *In IV Sent.*, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 2. For the division of satisfaction into its potential parts, see *ibid.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 2.

[21]The entire text reads as follows: "Unde si quis recte consideret, istae tres virtutes non ex aequo distinguuntur ab invicem, sed ordine quodam, sicut accidit in totis potentialibus, quorum una pars est perfectior altera, sicut anima rationalis est perfectior quam sensibilis, et sensibilis quam vegetabilis. Hoc enim modo scientia dependet ab intellectu sicut a principaliori. Et utrumque dependet a sapientia sicut a principalissimo, quae sub se continet et intellectum et scientiam, ut de conclusionibus scientiarum dijudicans et de principiis earundem" (*ST*, I-II, q. 57, a. 2 ad 2). For an explanation of the words "sub se continet" see n. 24.

can forgive only the latter, baptism alone has the full power of the whole. In the terminology used above,[19] therefore, forgiveness of sin is not divided *ex aequo* into baptism and penance but *ordine quodam*.

Perhaps the most useful instance of a potential whole is found in the sacrament of penance.[20] This sacrament is an *integral* whole, having three integral parts: contrition, confession, and satisfaction. These three together add up to make the sacrament of penance, and the sacrament is present to these parts neither according to its essence nor according to its power. But satisfaction, the third integral part, is itself a *potential* whole, divided by St. Thomas into three parts of unequal "power," only one of which has the fullness of the power of satisfaction, although each is essentially a true form of satisfaction. These three parts are almsgiving (the more principal part), prayer, and fasting.

So far there has been little difficulty in understanding the nature of a potential whole. The study of the virtues as potential parts will not be as easy. We shall deal first of all with the intellectual virtues and then with the moral virtues.

St. Thomas says that the intellectual virtues of wisdom, understanding, and scientific knowledge are not divided *ex aequo*, *sed ordine quodam*, *sicut accidit in totis potentialibus*. What he means by this should now be clearer. The whole is "intellectual virtue," and it is essentially present to each of these three inasmuch as each is essentially or truly an intellectual virtue. But the full power of intellectual virtue is realized completely in wisdom, less so in understanding, and least of all in scientific knowledge. The reason for this progression, St. Thomas says, is that scientific knowledge depends on understanding and is therefore less perfect than it, and both scientific knowledge and understanding depend on wisdom and are therefore less perfect than wisdom.[21]

It should be noted that St. Thomas does not say what the "power of intellectual virtue" is which is shared by these three virtues in decreasing gradation. It is not necessary that he do this. For his concern is not to show how "intellectual virtue" fulfills the definition of a potential whole. He is concerned only with showing that these three intellectual virtues, because this dependence is found among

them, are not divided *ex aequo* but according to a progression of more perfect and less perfect; and this same thing, he says, happens in a potential whole (*sicut accidit in totis potentialibus*).[22]

[22]There are many ways in which one virtue can be more principal than another. For example, (1) as simply more perfect. Thus charity is a more more perfect virtue than faith, and prudence more perfect than the other moral virtues. The basis of this perfection is the more perfect attainment of the "regula humanorum actuum" (*ST*, II-II, q. 23, a. 6). (2) As prior in time. In this sense faith is more principal than charity (*ST*, I-II, q. 62, a. 4 and q. 68, a. 8 ad 2). (3) Precisely *qua* virtue. Thus the moral virtues are more principally called virtues than the intellectual virtues (*ST*, I-II, q. 56, a. 3 and q. 61, a. 2). (4) By reason of a more perfect subject. Thus the intellectual virtues are more perfect than the moral virtues (*ibid.*, q. 61, a. 2 ad 3). (5) Because one virtue depends on another for its full perfection. This is the type of principality in question in the intellectual virtues. (6) Because one virtue is more perfect in one general area of human perfection. This is the type of principality involved between the cardinal virtues and their secondary or "attached" virtues, which will be discussed in the following section.

[23]*ST*, I-II, q. 65, a. 1 ad 3.

[24]A full explanation of how precisely wisdom makes these judgments is an important question but would take us far beyond the scope of this paper. Briefly, we can explain that the kinds of scientific knowledge—both their reasoning processes and the insight into their principles—depend ultimately on the validity of the universal first principles; and these principles the particular sciences can neither prove nor defend, since the subject matter of these principles extends beyond the area to which any particular science is limited and applies to *all* being. A natural philosopher, for example, can neither defend nor prove the principle of contradiction, and yet this principle (to which all the others can be reduced, according to *In XI Metaphys.*, lect. 5 [ed. Cathala, No. 2211] and also *ST*, I-II, q. 65, a. 2) is implied in each judgment he makes about his proper object, just as being is implied in every "changeable being" (see *In III Metaphys.*, lect. 5 [ed. Cathala, No. 392] and *In IV Metaphys.*, lect. 5 [Nos. 588-92]). Hence the scientific kinds of knowledge are dependent for their absolute certitude upon wisdom (metaphysics) which alone can defend these principles which are common to all beings (*In IV Metaphys.*, lect. 1 [ed. Cathala, No. 531]). This is one meaning of the "judgment" that wisdom exercises over the conclusions and principles of the sciences. The second meaning of "judgment" is that by which a superior becomes a norm or standard of the lower, so that a lack of conformity is the fault not of the superior but of the inferior. (For this distinction of judgments, see *ST*, I-II, q. 93, a. 2 ad 3.) In this way a virtuous man is said to judge all other men, for his actions become the norm of human conduct (see *In Evangelium S. Matthaei*, cap. 19, lect. unic.); actions which do not conform to this norm are "judged" evil. In the same way, wisdom judges the other kinds of knowledge, so that "whatever in these other sciences is found to be out of harmony with the truth of this science [sacred doctrine as wisdom] should be entirely condemned as false" (*ST*, I, q. 1, a. 6 ad 2. See also *In de Trin.*, q. 2, a. 3).

From what has been said, the meaning of the words in the text (see n. 21 above) "sapientia . . . quae sub se continet et intellectum et scientiam, ut de conclusionibus scientiarum dijudicans et de principiis earundem" should be clear. The text does not mean that wisdom contains understanding and scientific knowledge *in* it, as the parts of an integral whole. As a matter of fact, wisdom does involve a reasoning process and therefore also presupposes understanding. But this is not what is meant by the text, which states that wisdom contains understanding and scientific knowledge (the Piana edition's reading of "the kinds of scientific

The question, therefore, becomes, not what the "power of intellectual virtue" is but how it is that scientific knowledge is dependent upon understanding and how the two of them are dependent upon wisdom. The first of these is quite evident and St. Thomas does not give us any explanation in this text. Scientific knowledge involves reasoning from principles to conclusions. Since the conclusions can be no more certain than the principes from which they come, and since the knowledge and certitude of these principles are derived (or rather intuited) through the virtue of understanding, it follows that scientific knowledge is dependent on understanding for its certitude. The virtue of understanding is in no way dependent, however, upon scientific knowledge.[23] Hence, although the different species of scientific knowledge presuppose (and therefore seem to include as an integral part) understanding, yet looked upon as potential parts of "intellectual virtue," the latter is more perfect because more independent.

But this only makes our second question more difficult, since wisdom also involves a reasoning process and therefore would seem to be equally dependent on, and therefore less perfect than, understanding. St. Thomas answers that the species of scientific knowledge and the understanding that they involve are dependent on wisdom because the latter can judge both their conclusions and the principles of these species of scientific knowledge;[24] he says that although wisdom is dependent upon the understanding of its own first principles, this understanding is itself dependent on wisdom for an explanation of the subject and predicate of these principles, without which explanation there could be no understanding. In this sense, wisdom (metaphysics)

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knowledge" [*scientias*] seems more accurate to us) *under* it (*sub se*); that is, in the same way that a more principal part of a potential whole contains under it the secondary parts—the way, for example, baptism "contains" penance under it, and the way the priesthood contains the diaconate and subdiaconate under it. Only such a reading of the text can make clear the relation of the "sub se continet" to what follows, "ut de conclusionibus scientiarum [note the plural!] dijudicans et de principiis earundem," for wisdom contains understanding and scientific knowledge under it; that is, it is the more principal part of the potential whole because it can judge the conclusions of the sciences and their principles as well.

judges *its own* principles as well, and therefore the understanding of them is dependent on itself.[25]

There remains now only the task of considering the moral virtues as potential parts. A particular difficulty arises here from the fact that St. Thomas frequently speaks of the principal virtue without even mentioning the whole or the "power." But as we saw in our discussion of the intellectual virtues, it is not necessary that he do so, because he is not trying to show how this or that virtue fulfills the definition of potential part but what the relationship is that exists between the different potential parts. In such a framework, the whole is not important.

We will consider first justice and temperance and then, very briefly, fortitude and prudence.

Justice, taken in the general meaning of "giving to another his due," is the whole. This is essentially (truly) realized in justice (in the narrow sense), piety, and religion. In the latter two, however, we do not (because we cannot) give to our parents or to God what is their *complete* due, whereas in justice (in the narrow sense) we do give another his complete due. This latter is therefore the principal potential part of "giving another his due," while the others are secondary or attached virtues because they do indeed involve giving another his due but lack the power of doing it fully. It is obvious, of course, that the whole ("giving to another his due") is not a virtue, any more than "intellectual virtue" is itself another virtue.

From what has been said, the answers to the questions placed at the beginning of this paper concerning the relationship between piety and justice should now be clear. Piety is a potential part of justice (taken in the wide sense); it is not a part of justice taken in the narrower sense. We exercise justice in the narrower sense when we pay the grocer; at the same time we do not practice piety because these are

[25]The text for this, too long to quote here, is *ST*, I-II, q. 66, a. 5 ad 4.

[26]See text under n. 3 above.

[27]*ST*, II-II, q. 143, a. unic. In *ibid.*, q. 161, a. 4, this hope is explained as "motus spiritus in magna tendentis."

[28]See text under n. 2 above.

[29]Fortitude in *ST*, II-II, q. 128, a. unic. and prudence in *ibid.*, q. 148, a. unic.

[30]*In III Sent.*, d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qa. 1; *In IV Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 2; *ibid.*, d. 44, q. 3, a. 3, qa. 1 ad 4; *De Spirit. Creat.*, a. 11 ad 2; *ST*, III, q. 90, a. 3, and *ibid.*, I-II, q. 57, a. 2 ad 2.

[31]They could of course draw the same false conclusion concerning the other virtues as well; for example, that justice, piety, and religion are not distinct virtues.

distinct virtues, two distinct parts of the potential whole, "giving to another his due." [26]

The same relationship is involved in the temperance-humility relationship. Here again we find a wider and a narrower meaning. The wider meaning of temperance is "restraint in some area." The narrower meaning is restraint of the sense of touch. Since this is the hardest type of restraint, it is the principal part of the potential whole, temperance in the wide sense. Humility involves the restraint of hope and boldness,[27] and is therefore essentially a type of restraint. But because it is not as difficult as temperance in the narrower sense, it is only a secondary virtue or potential part, of which the whole is "restraint in some area." [28]

Fortitude and prudence are treated in much the same way.[29] Fortitude in the wide sense means "facing difficulty." When this involves facing death, there is had fortitude in the narrower sense and this is the principal virtue, involving the complete power of the whole, whereas patience and perseverance, trust (*fiducia*), and *magnificentia* are secondary parts because they involve less difficult situations. Prudence in the wide sense is the potential whole, of which prudence in the narrow sense, *eubulia*, *synesis*, and *gnome* are the potential parts.

We have deliberately refrained until now from explaining what is perhaps the most frequently used instance of potential whole in the writings of St. Thomas, the soul.[30] The reason for the delay is that it is not always immediately evident whether he is speaking of the souls of men, brutes, and plants, or of the rational, sensitive, and vegetative souls in man. For this reason, if some were to think that he was speaking of the latter type, they might possibly conclude that—since St. Thomas held that the rational, sensitive, and vegetative souls of man are not three distinct souls—the point of a potential whole is that the parts are only rationally distinct. From this they could perhaps conclude (falsely, of course) that wisdom, understanding, and scientific knowledge are not really distinct virtues.[31] On the other hand, if the example of soul were to be so understood that the human soul is the potential whole, and the souls of brutes and plants the

potential parts,[32] it could be concluded (again, erroneously) that wisdom "virtually" contains within itself the complete perfection of some—or even all— of the species of scientific knowledge explicitly. These dangers have now been avoided, since from all that has been said, it is clear that the point of a potential whole is not that the parts are not really distinct but rather that each potential part truly (essentially) shares in some perfection, but only one of these parts possesses the full power of that perfection, whereas the others share in that power in a decreasing series of less perfect ways.

[32]From the various instances and explanations which St. Thomas gives, it is clear that the notion of potential whole is not a simple notion, identically the same in all its details in the various uses. Not even the example of the "three souls" needs to be understood in the same way in all cases, and the soul as a "totum potestativum" in relation to its powers clearly is a different sort of potential whole.

Necessary Truths and Postulational Method

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Like Plato and certain modern philosophers, St. Augustine was impressed by the existence of certain necessary and immutable truths—eternal truths, if you will—which are neither created nor altered by the human mind. And to review the obvious, the entire thrust of St. Augustine's argument for God's existence frequently seems to be dependent upon the presence of such eternal truths. The argument runs somewhat as follows. Since the human mind is limited and prone to error, the existence of such propositions can only presuppose some unlimited eternal being, God. As an example of such truth, St. Augustine suggests number as something offering itself to all who use reason (*Confessions*, X, 12). Some apprehend it with ease, while others have much difficulty; but number is always present. Further, number does not change when apprehended. For these reasons, Augustine would consider number to be a good example of wisdom given by something which must be called God or which must be subordinate only to God (*ibid.*, X, 24).

At this point, however, those familiar with modern mathematics can voice a supposedly devastating criticism. Apparently the entire idea of number is fluid and largely a product of the human mind. Disregarding the fact that an argument does not rest solely upon its examples, some would argue that modern number-theory shows that our customary numerical notation may be changed in such a way that many accepted ideas of number have no fixed meaning or no meaning at all. The sum $3 + 7 = 10$ provides a pertinent example of this objection. Suppose we postulate a number system of positive, whole digits based on a group of five. In this case our numerical notation might run: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20. In such a system the very idea of seven would no longer exist. Rather we would speak of eleven, or $3 + 11 = 14$. And continuing the objection to its obvious end, how can an arbitrary symbol and concept form a valid example in a proof of God's existence?

To this argument there are at least two answers. St. Augustine would first answer that number is only one example of eternal truth perceived by

reason. If number can be shown to be merely a product of the human mind and not an eternal truth perceived by reason, he would draw upon another example. His proof is not dependent upon a unique situation. This is the first answer. A second answer—and an answer based on a fallacy in the original objection—hinges upon the fact that the fundamental nature of number theory has been misapprehended. Basically, the object has been confused with its sign.[1] The existence of such a paralogism may be easily demonstrated by examining one or two possible notations. Taking the set a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, we find that several systems of notation, or signs, may be used to describe it—remembering the prime restriction that there be a one-to-one correspondence between the whole integers of the notation and the individual members of the set.[2] Our customary system of notation based on ten is valid because it fulfills this qualification.

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

However, other systems of notation may be constructed. Using the group five as the basis of a numerical notation, we have:

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
1	2	3	4	5	10	11	12	13	14

Or, using the set *, //, *a* we have:

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
*	//	*a*	*O	**	*//	**a*	//O	//*	////

These too, are valid systems of notation, for they possess a one-to-one correspondence between the members of the set and the elements of the notation. And as long as this one-to-one correspondence between the members of the set is maintained, any system of notation is valid. Even one may be used, as it is in most calculating machines. For example:

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
1	10	11	100	101	110	111	1000	1001	1010

Now, what does this do to the argument that number is only an accident or a product of man's mind? Clearly it means that the basis of St. Augustine's proof remains untouched; indeed, in some respects it is augmented. That in one system "three plus seven equals ten" while in

[1]See the various works on elementary semantics in which the basis of all discussion hinges upon a distinction between object and sign.

[2]Kenneth O. May, *Elementary Analysis* (New York, 1952), p. 37.

[3]*Ibid.*, p. 45.

[4]*Principia Mathematica* (London, 1903).

[5]Frank Plumpton Ramsey, *The Foundations of Mathematics* (New York, 1931), p. 21.

[6]*Ibid.*, p. 9.

another system the idea of three plus seven does not exist is only an accident of notation. Actually, using the notation based on five, $3 + 7 = 10$ is equivalent to $3 + 11 = 14$. In reality, two sets are being added rather than two numbers, one set of "three" and one set of "seven," and to arrive at a correct and unique answer we must "add" the two sets by counting all the members of the combined sets.[3] Again, the notation of the answer is only an accident. Ultimately, then, this apparent objection only strengthens St. Augustine's position, for human reason has been able to force its way through an appearance of fluidity to the real truth.

This is the first objection to St. Augustine's use of number as an example. More difficult to answer is the objection that all mathematics, number included, is only a projection of man's mind and not a reflection of any fixed, eternal order. This basic position, frequently called the axiomatic method, was first formalized by Whitehead and Russell[4] and is vulgarly conceived to be a system which does away with all necessity for fixed rules. The gross argument runs as follows: Once a set of noncontradictory premises has been set forth, a mathematical system built upon these premises will be valid irrespective of its relation to the world of experience.

Again the bearing on St. Augustine's eternal truth is obvious. If all mathematical system, number included, is only an arbitrary creation of man's mind, how can it provide valid examples of truth given by God and discovered by man's reason? There are two possible answers to this objection. As might be expected, the first answer is merely a clarification of the axiomatic method. Ramsey points out that essentially the method of Whitehead and Russell is based on the existence of tautologies.[5] That is, the so-called axioms are merely tautological statements. Ramsey feels that this makes the validity of the axiomatic method suspect, but more to the present point is the effect on St. Augustine's argument. For if all mathematical argument is based on tautologies, St. Augustine's mathematical examples remain valid. This can be seen if we inquire into the mathematical meaning of tautological. Commonly considered a needless repetition of an idea or phrase, in mathematics and logic it is more narrowly defined as a self-evident and self-exhausting statement.[6] For example: It is either raining or not raining; or symbolically: p or not-p.

To the objection that all mathematical systems are man-made and therefore not valid indications of God's existence, St. Augustine would answer that only the superstructures are man-made. The basis of the various systems, the tautology, is something discovered by man's reason but created by God. More specifically, the manifest is not easily seen without the aid of reason. And while there is a difference between $3 + 7 = 10$ and

p or not-p, the difference can be held to be one of degree rather than one of kind.

Unfortunately, this argument verges on casuistry. Also, it tends to reduce the importance of man's reason by making him somewhat of an observer of the obvious; and since St. Augustine believed reason to be of fundamental importance in Christian thought, it tends to minimize the importance of his thought. If reason is reduced to discovering trivia in its search for God, there is the implication that reason is not as powerful as was first believed.

Fortunately, a second and much more powerful refutation of the axiomatic objection to St. Augustine's argument is given by Goedel's proof.[7] Goedel attacks the entire axiomatic method, the basis even of Greek mathematics, and presents proof that this method has limitations that rule out systematizing even the arithmetic of whole numbers.[8] Starting with efforts to prove arithmetic free from contradictions, Goedel shows that these are doomed to failure and comes to two major conclusions. First:

> [It is] . . . impossible to establish a meta-mathematical proof of the consistency of a system comprehensive enough to contain the whole of arithmetic—unless, indeed, this proof itself employs rules of inference much more powerful than the transformation rules used in deriving theorems within the system.[9]

More specifically, no system can by and in itself be complete. There will always be truths that the given axioms of a system do not cover. Second, "any consistent set of arithmetical axioms is incomplete." [10] That is, any finite number of added axioms will continue to give new truth so that any axiomatic approach to the theory of number cannot exhaust the domain of arithmetical truth.[11]

Returning to St. Augustine, or for that matter any philosopher who believes in the existence and importance of eternal mathematical truth, we see that this proof gives his example a solid butress. For while his specific example may be included in some particular system in such a manner as to become obvious or nonexistent, yet there will always be truths that can be discovered only by the use of reason and not by the mechanical manipulation of fixed rules—truths which imply the existence of God.

[7]Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, "Goedel's Proof," *Scientific American*, CXCIV, No. 6 (1956), 71.
[8]*Ibid.*
[9]*Ibid.*, 80.
[10]*Ibid.*
[11]*Ibid.*, 86.

The Logical Interest of the Topics as Seen in Abelard

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Father Ong in his *Ramus* describes Peter of Spain as giving "short shrift" to the doctrine of places and explains this by saying: "The notion of the places is not scientific in any precise logical or psychological sense, since the exact application of the local analogy in play here is very difficult, if not impossible to determine." [1] Leaving aside the analogy, the question may be raised whether there is any "precise logical" interest in the doctrine of places, or of "topics," as I prefer to call them. There may be little in the Renaissance logics which are the main object of Father Ong's study. But it is quite a different matter for medieval logic, as is evident from a consideration of perhaps the first great figure in the development of a specifically medieval logic. I refer to Peter Abelard, whose main work on the topics is now available in the recent edition of the *Dialectica* by L. M. De Rijk, where it takes up 160 of the 548 pages of text.[2]

What I propose to do here is to show from Abelard's analysis that there is a precise logical interest in the topics and incidentally to indicate how at least some of the matters of traditional topical concern fall within the scope of modern logic.

Abelard begins his consideration of the topics (*De Locis*) immediately after that of the syllogism, as does Peter of Spain in his *Summulae*, which became the classical text in elementary logic from the thirteenth century on. In it he is still concerned with inference, the great object of the logician's interest. But in turning from the syllogism to the topics, he passes from what he calls perfect to imperfect inference.

"Inference," Abelard writes, "consists in necessary consecution in the sense that the antecedent compels the consequent." But this necessity may come about in different ways. It may come from the structure itself; that is, from the way in which the elements of the argument are arranged. Then

> the truth of the consequent is manifested from the complex of the antecedent itself, the construction of the antecedent being so disposed that it contains within itself the construction of the consequent, as in syllogisms and in hypotheticals which have the form of syllogisms.

In this case we have perfect inference.[3]

On the other hand, the necessity may come from outside the structure,

ex rerum natura, in the sense that it comes from what is being inferred, or from the meaning of the terms, and not from the construction.[4]

To make clear the difference Abelard cites the following examples:

Perfect Inference[5]

1. Omnis homo est animal, omne animal est animatum, ergo omnis homo est animatus.

2. Si omnis homo est animal et omne animal est animatum, omnis homo est animatus.

Both have perfect inference; and the only difference between them, Abelard says, is that the hypothetical, which he calls a *consequentia*, lacks the assertion of the antecedents (*concessione antecedentium propositionum*).[6] In other words, he distinguishes the categorical from the hypothetical syllogism as what would now be called an inference-scheme from an implicative statement. In each case the inference is valid from the construction and not from the meaning of the terms. His teaching can accordingly be represented by the use of variables. Using *A* for "all," *C* for "if . . . . then," *K* for "and," " $\vdash$ " for assertion, we have:

1′. $\vdash$ Axy
$\vdash$ Ayz

$\vdash$ Axz

2′. CKAabAbcAac

[1]Walter J. Ong, *Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue* (Harvard, 1958), p. 117.

[2]Petrus Abelardus, *Dialectica*, ed. L. M. De Rijk (Assen, 1956). The *De Locis*, which is *Liber Primus* of *Tractatus Tertius*, extends from page 253 to page 413.

[3]"Inferentia itaque in necessitate consecutionis consistit, in eo scilicet quod ex sensu antecedentis sententia exigitur consequentis. . . . . Perfecta quidem est inferentia, cum ex ipsius antecedentis complexione consequentis veritas manifesta est et antecedentis constructio ita est disposita, ut in se consequentis quoque constructionem contineat, veluti in syllogismis aut in his hypotheticis quae formas habent syllogismorum" (*ibid.*, pp. 253-54). I should note that in translating I have tried to be as literal as possible, even at the risk of torturing the English language.

[4]"Quae quidem inferentiae, quamvis imperfectae sint quantum ad antecedentis constructionem, tamen necessitatem ex rerum natura saepissime tenent. . . . Perfectio itaque necessitatis etiam in his est inferentiis, non constructionis" (*ibid.*, p. 254).

[5]*Ibid.*

[6]*Ibid.*

[7]*Ibid.*, pp. 255, 257.

[8]"Quantum quidem ad rerum naturam quam movimus, de veritate consequentiae certi sumus, quia scilicet animal sine animato non posse subsistere scimus, non quidem quantum ad complexionem inferentis" (*ibid.*, p. 255).

[9]"Earum itaque tantum inferentiarum vis proprie dicitur locus quae imperfectae sunt, ut quod ad perfectionem inferentiae defuerit, loci assignatio suppleat" (*ibid.*, p. 262).

[10]Boethius, *De Differentiis Topicis*, II, *PL*, LXIV, 1185A; cf. De Rijk's introduction, p. xxix.

3. si omnis homo est animal, omnis homo est animatus.
4. si est animal est animatum.
5. si est homo est animal.

All, according to Abelard, are both true inferences (in that one thing follows from another in each) and necessary. But the necessity lies in what is inferred, in the meaning and not the construction of terms. Thus he writes: "It is with respect to what we know about the nature of things, and not with respect to the complex of the inference, that we are certain of the truth of the consequence." [8] In such cases we have to go outside the formal or logical structure and look at the relation between the meaning of the terms. It is here that the topic enters.

Consider No. 5 above. If we know that man is related to animal as species to genus, we have the "topic of species" (*locus a specie*) and can apply the topical maxim: *de quocumque predicatur species, et genus.* We now have all that is needed for a perfect inference, since, as Abelard says, "the assignment of the topic applies what is lacking to the perfection of the inference." [9] Let us see, then, what we have and how it goes together to make a perfect inference.

5.1. the relation of man to animal as species to genus
5.2. the maxim: *de quocumque predicatur species, et genus*
5.3. the imperfect inference: *si est homo est animal*

What we have is in effect an instance of what would now be called the logic of classes, only expressed metalogically in terms of operations on language. The inference becomes clearer if we express it in the object-language of the class logic.

Using "α", "β" for classes, "$\subset$" for class inclusion, x for individuals, "$\in$" for class-membership, "$\supset$" for "if . . . . then", "$\vdash$" for assertion, and "(x)" for the universal quantifier, we have:

5.1. $\vdash . \alpha \subset \beta$
5.2. $\vdash . \alpha \subset \beta . \supset : (\mathbf{x}) . x \in \alpha . \supset . x \in \beta$
5.3. $\vdash . x \in \alpha . \supset . x \in \beta$

So expressed it is clear at once why 5.3 is imperfect by itself and needs the topic, supplied by 5.1 and 5.2, to manifest the necessity of the inference. Given these two, 5.3 follows necessarily by the rule of detachment (if the sentence P is asserted [5.1], and the implication CPQ [5.2] is asserted, Q [5.3] may be detached and asserted, and dropping the universal quantifier).

Abelard, following his authority—Boethius, for the most part [10]—distinguishes two elements in the topic, which provides the division of topics into the *locus a differentia* and the *maxima propositio*. The first of these (of which 5.1 is an example) is defined as "that thing which in its relation to another constitutes the strength of the consecution." The *maxima* (of which 5.2 is an example) is "that proposition, containing the sense of many consequences, which shows the common mode of proof that the differences have in themselves according to the power of its relations." Thus Abelard claims that the maxim 5.2 "contains the sense of all these consequences: *si est homo est animal, si est margarita est lapis, si est rosa est flos, si est rubor est calor*, and others of this sort, in which species is antecedent to genus." [11]

The topical difference is extralogical, since it involves recognition that a certain relation holds between two things—in our example, that man in fact is related to animal as species to genus. The maxim is logical in that it involves no reference beyond itself. Expressed in the object language of modern logic, 5.2 is a law or thesis in the calculus of classes; in fact it is proposition *22.1 in the *Principia Mathematica* of Russell and Whitehead. Stated metalogically as it is by Abelard, it corresponds more closely to an axiom-scheme than to a thesis; the examples given in connection with the definition are not so much substitutions in a thesis as realizations of a certain form; that is, man, pearl, rose, red, are not substitutions for *species*, but each is a species of a certain genus But though distinct, both topical difference and maxim are needed to validate an imperfect inference. In this respect Abelard's description of the use of a topic speaks for itself:

> When of any terms we want to draw an inference by means of (*ex*) a Topical Difference and its Maxim, we consider first the relation (*habitudo*) of the Difference to the thing we want to infer (5.1). Having recognized it in those things, we then think of their mode of inference and designate the Maxim (5.2). Then according to it we at

[11] "Est autem locus differentia: ea res in cuius habitudine ad aliam firmitas consecutionis consistit. . . . Maxima vero propositio dicitur: ea propositio quae multarum consequentiarum continens sensus communem modum probationis, quam in eis suae differentiae tenent, secundum vim eiusdem habitudinis ostendit, veluti . . ." (*Dialectica*, p. 263).

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 313.

[13] "Locum ergo generaliter definientes *vim inferentiae* dicimus. . . . Locum autem artius accipientes philosophi definierunt *argumenti sedem*, vel id esse unde trahitur conveniens argumentum ad propositam quaestionem comprobandam" (*ibid.*, p. 253).

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Cf. I. M. Bochenski, *Formale Logik* (München), p. 219; E. Moody, *Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic* (Amsterdam, 1953), pp. 64-65, 80 ff.; K. Durr, *The Propositional Logic of Boethius* (Amsterdam, 1953). For the logical interest of Aristotle's *Topics*, see I. M. Bochenski's *Ancient Formal Logic* (Amsterdam, 1951), pp. 32-35, 63-70.

once compose the consequence concerning the things proposed (5.3). . . . Thus if we want to constitute a consequence from *man* to *animal*, we first consider the relation of man to animal, and when we have seen it to be that of species (5.1), we excogitate the common mode of inference from species to genus, which we express in the Maxim thus: *the genus can be predicated of whatever the species is* (5.2). Then we can state (*disponimus*) the consequence: *If it is man it is animal* (5.3). If anyone should doubt this consequence, we prove it through the assigning of the relation and the Maxim which have already been conceded, thus: *But man is a species of animal, and therefore this consequence is true: If it is man it is animal.*[12]

From this it is clear why Abelard wants to define a topic generally as a "force of inference" (*vis inferentiae*). He proposes this in order to make clear what he calls the narrower traditional definition of it as "a basis of argument (*argumenti sedes*), or that from which a fitting argument can be drawn to prove a proposed question."[13]

We have considered but one of the many topics. But this is sufficient to manifest their logical interest. In the topical maxim we have found a logical entity that has a precise logical sense according to even the most rigorous standards. Our example has its analogue in the modern logic or calculus of classes, and there are others of this kind. However, the logical interest is not exhausted by these. As Abelard notes, the topics involve the consideration of hypotheticals;[14] and, as is now well known, the medieval treatment of these corresponds in several ways to the modern logic of propositions.[15] Thus although some of the topics may be philosophical or rhetorical rather than logical, others are of strictly logical concern.

Chronicle

The Department of Philosophy of the University of Notre Dame held a symposium on Christian wisdom on March 6 and 7, 1959. Professor W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., of Yale University, reported on work in progress in the field of English and criticism. Professor Alceu Amoroso Lima, of the University of Brazil and the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, spoke on Christianity and sociology. Professor Frank L. Keegan, of the University of Notre Dame, spoke on the most significant achievements of the work of M. Jacques Maritain. Professor Joseph J. Sikora, of Loyola University (Chicago), discussed the relations between modern science and Christian wisdom. On Friday evening, March 6, there was a panel discussion on the problem of academic excellence in a Catholic university. The Reverend John J. Cavanaugh, c.s.c., was chairman; participants were Sister Madeleva, c.s.c., the Reverend Edward O'Connor, c.s.c., Professor F. J. Crosson, and Professor Alvan Ryan. Professor William K. Frankena, of the University of Michigan, spoke on religion in the universities; and the Reverend Virgil C. Blum, s.j., of Marquette University, discussed freedom of choice in education.

The Aquinas Lecture for 1959, annually presented by the Aristotelian Society of Marquette University, was given on March 8 by Professor William Oliver Martin of the University of Rhode Island. Professor Martin spoke on metaphysics and ideology. He maintained that only a realistic analysis could lead to a metaphysics as a science of the real. With the rejection of realism, philosophers were driven to substitute for metaphysics a system of postulates, built up after the fashion of a theory in experimental science. Such a postulation system Professor Martin calls an ideology.

The Metaphysical Society of America held its tenth annual meeting at Brooklyn College, March 20 and 21, 1959. The first paper was read by Professor William Barrett (New York University); the commentator was Richard M. Millard (Boston University). Professor Barrett maintained that the world of Homer is characterized by presentness, clarity, and substance, and that our contemporary understanding of time would not have been accepted by the Greeks. Professor Henry Aiken (Harvard University) spoke on the "metaphysics of nostalgia"; the commentator was William A. Earle (Northwestern University). Professor Aiken rejected the possibility of a metaphysics; he then tried to give a psychological aetiology of nostalgia. After the dinner meeting, Professor Rudolf Allers (Georgetown University) gave the presidential address; the commentator was the Reverend Robert O. Johann, s.j. (Loyola Seminary). Professor Allers spoke on the inherent limitations of the "subjective knowledge" extolled by existentialists. He

insisted on the need to pay attention to our common world, on the reality of the transsubjective and the intrasubjective as well as the subjective. For him, the object of metaphysics is "being-in-a-world-*that-is*." On Saturday, Professor Donald C. Williams (Harvard University) attempted to explain mind on the basis of matter alone, a thesis which he joined to direct realism, and held for a complete actualism (a total denial of potency). The commentator, Frank Parker (Haverford College), sharply distinguished the thesis of realism from that of materialism. The last paper was by Dr. Rollo May, who inquired about an ontological basis for psychoanalysis; the commentator, George Schrader (Yale University), pointed out that there were a host of ontologies, some of them mutually incompatible.

At the business meeting, the offices of secretary and treasurer were combined into one; and the incumbent secretary, Professor Frank Parker, consented to take on the new office. Professor Richard McKeon (University of Chicago) was elected president for the next year.

The Thirty-Third Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association was held in New York, March 31 and April 1, 1959. The theme of the program was contemporary American philosophy. On Tuesday morning, the general session consisted of a panel discussion on Platonic elements in epistemology by Professor Fulton H. Anderson (University of Toronto) and the Reverend Robert J. Henle, S.J. (Saint Louis University). Professor Anderson gave an analysis of the Platonic theory of knowledge and presented the arguments in favor of it. Father Henle analyzed the presuppositions behind both contemporary empiricism and classical idealism, and showed that these were (usually unanalyzed) Platonic positions. In contrast, he proposed a phenomenological analysis of the act of knowing leading to a Thomistic theory of knowledge. On Wednesday morning, there was a panel discussion on trends in phenomenology and existentialism by Professor Herbert Spiegelberg (Lawrence College), Professor William A. Gerhard (Brooklyn College), and the Reverend Quentin Lauer, S.J. (Fordham University). Professor Spiegelberg gave an excellent description of the origins of phenomenology and its various developments up to the present. Professor Gerhard discussed the philosophy of Heidegger, concentrating on the function of "nothingness" in that philosophy. Father Lauer went into the historical antecedents of modern phenomenology. The various sectional meetings dealt with more or less closely connected problems in particular areas, according to the usual sectional divisions. At the banquet, a citation for the award of the Cardinal Spellman-Aquinas Medal to the Reverend Gerald B. Phelan, prepared by M. Jacques Maritain, was read in the latter's absence. Father Phelan responded with an address in which he spoke of the interrelations of being, order, and

knowledge. This was followed by the presidential address of the retiring president of the association, Professor Lawrence E. Lynch (St. Michael's College). Professor Lynch talked about some of the difficulties involved in learning philosophy. At the business meeting, last year's vice-president, the Reverend Robert Lechner, C.PP.S. (St. Joseph's College, Collegeville, Ind.) took over as president, and Professor William M. Walton (St. Joseph College, West Hartford. Conn.) was elected vice-president for the coming year. It was announced that next year's meeting will be held in St. Louis, and the general topic will be contemporary European philosophy, with an emphasis on British analysis.

The "Aquinas Circle" of the College of the Holy Cross presented a philosophical disputation in honor of St. Thomas, on Wednesday, May 13, 1959. Four theses from the philosophy of human nature were defended by two seniors, and five seniors acted as objectors. The audience also took part in asking questions of the defenders.

Duquesne University held a symposium on evolution on April 4, 1959. The participants were Bernard J. Boelen (Duquesne University), Frederick C. Bawden (director of the Rothamsted Experimental Station, Gottfried O. Lang (Catholic University of America), Andrew G. van Melsen (Universities of Nijmegen and Gronigen), and the Reverend Cyril Vollert, S.J. (St. Mary's College). It is planned to publish the lectures.

The Department of Philosophy of Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, conducted its third biennial Philosophical Institute in the Teaching of Philosophy in a four-day session from June 15 through June 18. Participants at the institute addressed themselves to the topic of demonstration and its realization in the several philosophical disciplines in the expectation that a fuller appreciation of the nature and employment of demonstration would make for increased effectiveness in their teaching of philosophy. One paper was delivered each day by a speaker who served as that day's discussion leader. Small group discussions on the topic of the day followed the paper and were themselves followed by a general discussion of that same topic. Reverend William Baumgaertner, of the St. Paul Seminary, spoke on "Demonstration from the Point of View of the Logician." Dr. Francis Collingwood, of Marquette University, spoke on "Demonstration in the Philosophy of Nature." Dr. James Anderson, of Villanova University, delivered a paper on "Demonstration in Metaphysics." Reverend William Dooley, S.J., of Marquette University, spoke on "Demonstration in Moral Philosophy." Over fifty philosophy teachers participated in the institute, representing twenty-four schools from thirteen states and one Canadian province. The institute was under the direction

of Dr. Edward Simmons, assisted by Mr. James Murphy, both of Marquette University.

The American Physical Society, at its 1959 summer meeting in the East (held at Marquette University, June 18, 19, and 20) presented a symposium "On the Nature of Physical 'Knowledge.'" Professor P. W. Bridgman, of Harvard University, read a paper, "Can Physical 'Knowledge' be Expected to Lead to a Full Understanding of Reality?" He insisted on having the word "knowledge" put in quotation marks, so that it could be defined as the knowledge of the physical sciences. In answering in the negative, Professor Bridgman wished to exclude the idea that there might be other kinds of knowledge; his point was that scientific knowledge is necessarily limited by its instruments, especially by the human nervous system which to him is the organ of thought. Professor Frank Collingwood, of Marquette University, maintained that physical knowledge is distinguished by its quantitative approach to reality; he argued his point especially through Plato and Aristotle. Professor Henry Margenau, of Yale University, discussed the undemonstrable presuppositions of science, carrying his analysis somewhat further than he had in his previous works. The Reverend George P. Klubertanz, s.j., of Saint Louis University, discussed the relevance of physical laws and facts to moral and social action; he pointed out that such knowledge must be taken into account in certain types of moral and ethical judgment. Professor Alfred Landé, of Ohio State University, argued that physicists should not be content with the present dualism of wave and particle, and proposed a way of dealing with the facts which would accept the particle view as ultimate. The appointed commentators were Professor Adolf Grünbaum, of Lehigh University, and R. L. Seeger, of the National Science Foundation. The formal papers were followed by a good discussion from the audience.

Xavier University of Cincinnati held an institute on the philosophy of education, August 3 to 14, 1959, under the leadership of the Reverend Bernard J. F. Lonergan, s.j., of the Gregorian University.

The Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, founded during the course of the first International Congress for Medieval Philosophy held at Louvain and Brussels, August 28 to September 4, 1958, has announced a number of projects. It has determined to encourage the contribution of all medievalists to the *Glossaire du Latin philosophique médiéval*, a project established in 1946 in connection with the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. Results of textual studies should be sent to Pierre Michaud-Quantin, Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines, 17, rue de la Sorbonne, Paris 5. The society is also interested in knowing

whether medievalists are in need of copies of out-of-print texts which might be reproduced by photo-offset. Scholars are urged to communicate their needs to Professor Michaud-Quantin, so that publishers can find out whether there will be a market for such editions. The society has also established a secretariate for information concerning work on medieval philosophy; the secretary is M. M. Giele, 2, place Cardinal Mercier, Louvain. It is hoped that all who are doing research in medieval philosophy will give their names to the secretary and indicate the work they are doing, with as complete an indication of future publication as possible. The secretary hopes eventually to publish a *Bulletin* of studies in progress.

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The Idea of Freedom. **By Mortimer J. Adler. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1958. Pp. xxvii + 689. $7.50.**

This work, to be completed in another volume, is "the first in a series of studies which the Institute for Philosophical Research plans to carry forward by producing similar treatments of other fundamental ideas" (p. xvii). The institute, established in San Francisco in 1952 for such studies, hopes that they "will make a substantial contribution to the clarification of the central idea to which they are all related —the idea of man" (p. xxvii).

While the volume is the fruit of a co-operative effort by the staff and consultants of the institute, it is fittingly authored by the institute's leader and director, Mr. Adler. His gift for dialectic and his persistent determination clearly to state and face issues and to lead others to face them seems to reach its most comprehensive and useful scope in such work. He, indeed, reminds one of Abelard to whose *Sic et Non*, as well as to the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, this work is compared (p. 77).

A brief general introduction describes the aim and approach of the institute. Faced with increasing philosophical and cultural diversity and a relativism which would maintain that such diversity is ultimate and irreducible, the institute starts from the assumption (to be verified in their studies) that the Western tradition of philosophical thought manifests not merely diversity but genuine disagreements which presuppose genuine agreements as to pertinent topics and issues. By discovering, explicitly formulating, and ordering these we might hope to replace a "great, blooming, buzzing confusion" with an "*understood diversity* or *diversity within the framework of an intellectual community*" (p. xxii).

Book I (pp. 1-79) explains the dialectical method and terminology to be employed in this and subsequent studies, and points to its uses in science and philosophy. The data of the study is the immense philosophical literature in Western culture dealing with human freedom (or another basic idea). The function of the corps of dialecticians is to "listen" impartially to this great discussion and to reconstruct it as controversy, taking account of the implicit as well as the explicit content. It is neither history nor philosophy. It abstracts from historical contexts to get at the purely

philosophical issues, but it does not of itself involve doctrinal development of the philosophical content. While the author carefully indicates the limitations of this method, he maintains that comprehensive and exclusively dialectical work is an indispensable condition for the sound development of philosophy.

Excluding purely equivocal uses, the terms which express the basic ideas in our philosophical tradition have been employed in distinct but related meanings. The first task of the dialectician is to discover and formulate these irreducibly distinct subjects of discussion in such fashion that all parties engaged would agree to the identification although they might disagree about other attributes of this subject. With these as guides he can now formulate an identification of the general subject (for example, freedom) which provides the analogical unity for the particular subjects. Finally, he can reconstruct the special and general controversies about these subjects and marshal the arguments for each side of each issue.

Book II, the remainder of the volume, is concerned entirely with the identification of the special and general subjects which go by the name of freedom. Book III, which will appear in a subsequent volume, will construct the controversies, issues, and arguments.

With regard to freedom, Adler and his staff identify three principal and two subordinate distinct subjects of discussion. These should be familiar to Thomists (St. Thomas holds for all but one, the collective freedom, the specialty of Marx and a few others), but the author skillfully employs the precision instruments of logic to bring out their exact meaning and distinction. And in the course of this identification much more is accomplished; the differences which have to be examined already point to the issues and give insight into the attitudes and tendencies in the various schools.

The comprehensiveness of the work is attested by the large bibliography of works referred to or examined. Obviously the evidence adduced in the text to support the interpretation had to be selective and will be contested in many instances. But the author has examined the data with care and respect, and has selected telling texts which will be hard to dispute.

One review has already questioned the author's impartiality, maintaining that "he calls favorite witnesses to the stand time and again" (*Time*, Sept. 22, 1958, p. 56). In fact, one does not read far in this book before seeing that Aquinas is a prominent name, and Maritain is not far behind. This might be partiality; but it might be impartiality. Aquinas does seem to have been a rather intelligent fellow, open to all aspects of reality, exacting, and orderly. He may have discussed these matters with more precision and comprehensiveness than others—than even our "analysts" and journalistic pundits. By consulting the fine author index to Book II,

one will also note that Dewey, Locke, Kant, and Hegel, who are not exactly Thomists, run pretty close to Aquinas. Some Thomists may be surprised also to find Aquinas so frequently on the same side with Locke and Montesquieu and, somewhat less frequently, with Dewey.

Of course, this work tells us nothing directly about the reality of freedom, only about the idea of freedom. But Mr. Adler seems right. This is of no little importance to intelligent controversy and philosophical growth. The work provides the framework for orderly treatment and a wealth of texts and references on freedom. Possibly its most interesting aspect is the possibility opened by its method. Scholastics might even take a second look at the "Scholastic method"—much derided, and sometimes deservedly—to see if they haven't something worth rehabilitating in a new way lest their philosophy appear "mere poetry" (cf. pp. 73-74).

ROBERT O. JOHANN, S.J., *Loyola Seminary*

***La philosophie de la nature: La nature en général* (deuxième fascicule). By Joseph de Tonquédec, S.J. Paris: Lethielleux, 1957. Pp. 279.**

The first fascicle of the present work, which appeared in 1956, concerned itself with prolegomena to a philosophy of nature. There the author took up such topics as the idea of nature, the definition of science, the notion of matter, the distinction between the philosophy of nature and the experimental sciences, and so on. In the present second fascicle, he begins his elaboration of the philosophy of nature itself and brings a basically traditional approach to a consideration of the ultimate structure of cosmic reality; that is, substance-accident composition and hylomorphism. A third and final fascicle, yet to appear, will be devoted to an analysis of motion, space and time, and the various accidents of material being: quantity, quality, relations, and so on.

Father de Tonquédec has a penchant for detached notes and appendices. Eight appendices and eight notes take up more than 100 of the 279 pages of the present volume. They range from a consideration of whether or not St. Thomas changed his mind about *dimensiones interminatae* to a study of Bergson's cosmology. Some of these are quite interesting. For example, the appendix devoted to distinguishing substantial unity from quantitative continuity, while basing itself strictly on texts from Aristotle and St. Thomas, represents a real advance over the thinking found in most manuals.

The body of the book consists of two chapters. The first considers the substance-accident structure implicit in cosmic restlessness, the nature of

the relationship between substance and accident, the evidence for asserting a plurality of substances, and the "authentic" notions of substance and accident as contrasted with some of the bizarre interpretations that have appeared in the course of history. The second and longer chapter takes up hylomorphic composition and, after a twofold demonstration of the fact of such composition (first from the active-passive aspects of material reality, secondly from substantial change), treats in detail the traditional ideas and problems connected with the notions of prime matter and substantial form. Both chapters are characterized by a marked effort on the author's part to substantiate his various positions by quoting from Aristotle and St. Thomas, and, moreover, to stand with these thinkers against all comers.

Yet, despite the author's obvious and thorough familiarity with his chosen masters—a familiarity that enables him to utilize to full advantage the riches they contain—there is, nevertheless, an air of unreality about the whole approach. This unreality is not due to maintaining a strictly philosophical methodology in the realm of material nature; too many contemporary writers on cosmology err, I think, in the other direction. In their effort to link their work with the trends of modern science, they too often provide us with some strange hybrid that is neither philosophy nor science. The unreality is due rather to the fact that some of the basic notions remain ultimately unexamined. I have in mind particularly the idea of substance, which is central to the present volume. It seems to me that a satisfactory cosmology will remain a desideratum until something of an analogy of substance in the material order has been worked out. Such an analogy would demand that attention be paid to other characteristics of substance than its simply being substrate for accidents. We have in mind, for example, the varying degrees of "self-hood" or independence manifested on the different levels of material reality; or conversely, the greater or less aptitude that particular material entities show for entering as elements into larger systems. Indeed, this tension between being a *thing in itself* and being *part of a whole* would seem to be characteristic of material being as such, so that while one or the other gains prominence as one ascends or descends the scale of nature, neither of the opposing features is ever absent. If such is the case, however, then it is not surprising that a wholly univocal view of substance should seem somewhat out of touch with the real.

This, however, is not so much a criticism of Father de Tonquédec's work in particular as it is of Scholastic treatises in general. A fault more peculiarly his own might be that of excessive wordiness. But this—if indeed it is a fault—is of little importance when compared with the high level of competence that our author brings to his work.

WALTER J. ONG, S.J., *Saint Louis University*

The Inward Morning: A Philosophical Exploration in Journal Form. **By Henry G. Bugbee, Jr. With an introduction by Gabriel Marcel. State College, Pa.: Bald Eagle Press, 1958. Pp. 232. $5.00.**

It is not easy even to approximate the climate of humility and wonder from which the formal philosophies which we know today have grown. In the formal study of philosophy, we go to considerable pains to rehearse questions as they have been shaped by being passed on from others. We have often heard answers before we are effectively aware of the questions to which they correspond. The answer itself, rather than the not too articulate state of mind leading originally to formulation of the question, may be our starting point in philosophizing.

Although it may no longer be possible to establish ourselves in a pre-philosophical climate, Professor Bugbee has undertaken to do something very much like this in *The Inward Morning*. He wishes to take us back to the threshold of philosophizing—not the threshold as it was known to antiquity or to any age before our own, but to a kind of threshold within our American culture today. This book is not a book about philosophy, although it is by a philosopher. It is a deliberate dipping into experience. As a consequence it is strange, almost quaint, and may prove unattractive and even unnerving to those philosophers who could profit from it most.

Even in the case of philosophies with which we are familiar the initial starting points or grounds of philosophizing are often strange, unreal, and comprehensible, if at all, only with extreme effort and attention. Thus, for example, in a work such as Joseph Owen's *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1951), we find the grounds of some of Aristotle's thinking laid out with profound perception and understanding; but the understanding is achieved only by the author's introducing himself and his readers into an entire culture—the ancient Greek culture which, despite our continuity with it, as a whole is to us quite bizarre. But its very bizarreness is our asset. It restores to us something of the sense of awe and bafflement with which early man encountered reality and with which sensitive persons still encounter it today.

A similar sense comes over us as we read Bugbee's work. In this case the sense has to do with the bizarreness of our own culture, conveyed by minute and scrupulous descriptions of the writer's relationship to things outside, descriptions which include vignettes of the effects produced on the author by such activities as rowing, building a dam, and "swamping"

(boyhood exploration of swamps). Any description of "immediate" experience reveals the culture which has made possible this particular immediacy, and Bugbee is entirely conscious of the fact that his descriptions register many aspects of the particular culture of which he and we are heirs. Here is the transcendentalist vision (with perhaps some fresh increment of Eastern influence), the close attention to experience which derives in great part from desperately sincere Protestant religiosity, a somewhat related reflective aestheticism reminiscent of Santayana, a *joie-de-vivre* suggesting Saint-Exupéry (as Marcel himself notes in his introduction, p. 27), and much else besides.

But principally Bugbee reveals the intimate relationship between the grounds of experience known to Americans because of their particular place in history and certain currents in non-American philosophy which can be labeled existentialist. Bugbee's procedure through his work is not unlike Marcel's in his *Journal métaphysique*. An intermittent diary provides reflections and occasional quotations, after the fashion of a somewhat expanded old commonplace book. But Bugbee's concerns are not quite the same as Marcel's. Everywhere the warp and woof and seams of the past and contemporary American mind show through the fabric:

> *Moby Dick* seems to me an articulate introduction into the presence of things in their finality: After all is said and done, after all attempt at final reckoning has run its course, and shipwreck places a seal on human lips, there is yet a word spoken: "Now small fowls flew screaming over the yet yawning gulf; a sullen white surf beat against its steep sides; then all collapsed, and the great shroud of the sea rolled on as it rolled five thousand years ago." Things exist in their own right; it is a lesson that escapes us except as they hold us in awe (pp. 163-164).

Bugbee's outlook has a great attraction for Marcel, and it is to the credit of the French philosopher that he recognizes the attraction at the very time when, as someone outside American culture, he protests his own limitations for assimilating all that Bugbee's sensibility has to offer. Bugbee's thought and Marcel's meet in that they are both exploratory, both attempts at communication deriving from facing honestly the isolation of the self, and both reverent in a way which makes them fruitful. However, Marcel's reverence tends to lodge in persons, Bugbee's in things; and thus the isolation of the American is—true to the American tradition—more complete. The various themes which weave through the discussion—the self, the meaning of man, God, meditation, prayer, critiques of or extrapolations from what this or that philosopher says—tend to focus on the person-thing mystery more, it seems, than on any one other subject. This

is what gives Bugbee's thought its value, for the person-thing mystery is in great part America herself and could offer grounds for America's contribution to the development of philosophy. (Here and throughout, "America" and "American" refer specifically to the United States.) Bugbee catches this mystery in an inspired, if wraith-like, fashion through his concept of the "wilderness"—the exterior wilderness and its interior correlative in human consciousness. He devoted numerous passages to the wilderness theme, which Marcel with great discernment singles out in his introduction as crucial. The wilderness is America (the America of the United States). It is man alone on the frontier, man-against-things rather than man-against-man (the Old World).

In the polar attraction between Marcel's thought and Bugbee's thought there lies, I believe, great hope, not merely for Marcel's continuing better understanding of America but for some kind of philosophical development of major significance. Apart from the remarkable thinking of Père Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, S.J., I know of no serious full-scale attempts to interpret a personalist world with full and honest respect for the fact that such a world, as we now know, comes into being only after an incredibly long and elaborate evolution of a material universe which has for billions upon billions of years no persons in it at all, although all through this period it is building itself up by a progressive "interiorization" to the point where man becomes a cosmic possibility. A great weakness of personalist existentialism generally, as well as of almost all other philosophies to date, has been an inability or unwillingness to view the human person in the full perspectives in which we now know material creation really exists. From one point of view this means an inability or unwillingness to explore the full relationship of person and thing. Certainly, we shall never get quite to the bottom of this mysterious relationship. But in the tension between Marcel's personalist personalism and Bugbee's personalist objectivism some new thinking on the matter should be generated. The particularization of reflection in two somewhat different, if related, cultures is itself good, for one feels that in an evolving universe there is need for philosophy to pay more attention to contingency, to rootedness, environment, and history than was the case when the cosmos was supposed to be static in ways we know today are impossible. The humility and reverence which each thinker here shows gives us special reason for hope.

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Ramus and Talon Inventory. **By Walter J. Ong, S.J. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 558. $10.00.**

Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue. **By Walter J. Ong, S.J. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. xix + 408. $10.00.**

The first of these volumes is a list of editions of the works of Peter Ramus and Omer Talon, which provides part of the evidence which the author, in the second work, uses to establish the development of Ramism and its influence. An introductory discussion (pp. 1-31) and comments on the contents and inter-relationships of various editions, interspersed at strategic points throughout the listing, are most illuminating for the bibliophile and the historian of ideas.

The second of the two volumes is a study of Ramism, its influence, and its meaning. In the first section, the author begins by recalling what is generally known and supposed about Ramism, then gives a carefully authenticated version of Ramus's life, and concludes with an examination of his program of "anti-Aristotelianism." The second section gives the background: Scholastic logic, Agricola's place-logic, the nature of the "philosophy" in the medieval arts curriculum, and the urge to rapidly prepare teachers for the rush of young students. Some of this historical background has been developed by other historians. Father Ong has juxtaposed some of these hitherto isolated results and has added evidences of his own. Most significant, in this section, in his contention that university statutes are not always descriptions of fact; textbooks, accounts of lectures given, programs of courses, give a different and more realistic picture. One of the items noted concerns the content of the philosophy courses as they were given. These were devoted to logic (which reached down into grammar) and natural philosophy, with the emphasis on the more particular aspects of physics, biology, physiology. Metaphysics and ethics were occasionally not covered at all, most often were given only a cursory nod. Father Ong gives concrete examples: in a textbook of over two hundred pages, only six were devoted to metaphysics; in one course program, six weeks were allotted to ethics. Moreover, he notes that the students were in their early teens (that is, younger than the average high-school students of today).

The third section deals with Ramism. The most important elements of this are the Ramist dialectic and the notion of method. Dialectic, for Ramus, is identical with logic (and with the classical rhetoric); it is the art of speaking well, and this is identical with the art of reasoning. It is composed of two movements, invention and judgment. Ramus insists that

his dialectic be "natural"; as Father Ong points out, the "nature" in question seems to be nothing more than the content of the curriculum. And it is to this same point of reference that we must look for the meaning of exhortation to look to "things." The invention part of dialectic was the discovery of an appropriate middle term; and the way to find such terms was to look through the appropriate "places," or arguments. The "judgment" of Ramist dialectic is the comparison or assembling of the terms discovered. The notion of method in Ramus is complex and varying. At first, method is proceeding from the more universal to the less and thence to the singular; at the same time, it is conceived of as proceeding from the definition to the properties. Later on, the notion of first principles comes in; and the final result is the statement that method consists in proceeding from what is clearer (the definition and the universal are still cited as examples) by means of homogeneous axioms to the clarification of unknown consequents. In this transformation, as Father Ong points out, reasoning, proof, and teaching are all identified. The third major contribution of Ramism is the modified notion of rhetoric. It consists now merely of the ornamentation of speaking and in a kind of way can be considered as superfluous, just as poetry, by being reduced to rhythm, becomes unnecessary.

Throughout his discussion of Ramism, Father Ong employs two terms to characterize the style of that movement: it is "visual," and it is "quantitative." Father Ong contrasts the visual approach of the Ramists to the "aural" approach of the older Aristotelians. As evidence of the latter, he refers to expressions such as "praedicaments" (involving the root *dicere*, to say), "categories" (involving the root, *agoreuein*, to address, assert). Following Louis Lavelle, he exploits the visual-aural distinction to show how the shift to visual treatment was hastened by the necessity for simplification, for teachability, and for uniformity. Not only does the printed word take precedence over the spoken, but the visual diagram becomes more significant even than the word. The teacher becomes a lecturer and, even worse, an expounder of a textbook. In the aural tradition, however, diagrams cannot be used; the emotional and imaginative overtones of language cannot be suppressed; the discussion or "dialogue" predominates over the monologue and the monograph. All this is true in the context of language itself, as well as in that of teaching. Yet we must also remember that visualization, when it is concerned with things rather than with verbal symbols, is not poorer but richer than the aural manipulation.

Father Ong also speaks often of the quantification of logic. Here, an

important distinction is in order. The quantification which was begun in the late Middle Ages, and recovered in modern logic, is a quantification along the lines of algebra. The quantification of the Ramists, by contrast, is modeled on geometry. Here the visual approach to language is a strong contributory factor. The Ramists wished to make the relationships between terms "visible at a glance." The representation of these symbols in space was the means most often used (and the very notion of "logical places" and of "method"—from the Greek word for "way" or "road" is connected with such symbols). The kind of diagram that became almost a symbol of Ramist technique is that of table of divisions of a subject by dichotomies. Father Ong includes a number of such diagrams in his text, and the extent to which they were carried is a sure sign of the significance attached to them. In such works, the mere making of divisions into two disjunctive classes seems to be all that is done. To proceed by making complete disjunctions seems to be the essence of a scientific treatment. The irony is that such procedures were at a later period imagined to be a characteristic of ancient and medieval thinking.

After reading through this richly documented study, some readers may wonder whether Ramus was worth so much work and why he had such an influence. There seems to be something like a "law of history" to the effect that any period deserves its leaders. From this point of view, a prudent reader may fear for our own times.

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